Friend or Foe: The Chinese Interest in Greenland and how it Impacts the Relationship Between Greenland and Denmark

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Abstract

This thesis investigates how the increased Chinese interest in investing in Greenland is impacting on the relationship between Denmark and Greenland. While the Chinese interest in Greenland is still deemed to be purely economic, there is a latent fear among Danish government officials and politicians that in time it will also be political, and that Greenlandic institutions do not hold the capacity to deal with a potential political pressure from China.

In Greenland this fear is not shared. On top of the Greenlandic wish list is independence. The main obstacle to achieving this goal is that Greenland does not have the national economy to sustain their desired level of welfare on their own. The prospect of massive Chinese investments thus serves as a promise of an independent future.

This thesis employs the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and looks into how Greenland and Denmark are constantly balancing on a knife’s edge in a securitization game. In securitization theory, an actor can take an issue and move it from being normal politics to being a security issue by using a specific securitizing rhetoric. The thesis shows how Denmark often presents Greenland for a latent threat to securitize the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. Greenland is not interested in the investments being securitized, as they want to appear a safe haven for investments. At the same time Denmark cannot make a full securitization because that would be perceived as a colonizing act by Greenland and the rest of the world.

The thesis applies content analysis and discourse analysis as it investigates the Greenlandic and Danish governments’ perspectives on the Chinese interests, respectively. The official government perspectives are held up against two cases. The first case is concerns a naval base that was up for sale, but then withdrawn from the market when a Chinese company made a bid for it. The second case concerns the Greenlandic minerals and Chinese investors. Both cases illustrate how the Danish-Greenlandic lack of cooperation is rooted in an unresolved dispute on how China should be perceived - as a security issue or as an economic saviour.
List of Abbreviations

- BRI – Belt and road initiative
- DDIS – Danish Defence Intelligence Service
- FMMDA – The Future Missions of the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Arctic
- GDP – Gross Domestic Product
- GME – Greenland Minerals and Energy
- IA – Inuit Ataqatiigit
- IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
- MoD – Ministry of Defence
- PRC – Peoples Republic of China
- REE – Rare Earth Minerals
- UNCLOS – United Nations Law of the Sea
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Introduction

“Is it not about time that after 300 years of co-existence, the majority of which has been blissful, we openly declare each other our love and mutual respect. We are still awkward with each other and tread on our own toes while failing to make a number of important decisions for the common benefit of the nations in the Kingdom”¹ (Rosing and Kleist, 2012: My translation)

The opening quote is from a feature in the Danish newspaper Politiken in 2012. The authors of the feature are Kuupik Kleist, who back then served as premier of Greenland, and Minik Rosing, who is an acknowledged Danish-Greenlandic Professor of Geology at Copenhagen University. The awkwardness the two are describing is up to this day still present inside the Kingdom of Denmark. One important issue that is affected by the awkward relations between the two nations is how the increased Chinese interest in the Arctic region in the past 10 plus years, and more specifically the Chinese interest in Greenland, should be handled. The present thesis studies the competing perceptions of China’s interest in Greenland, as held by Denmark and Greenland, respectively.

Literally starting from the top, the ice on the North Pole is melting due to climate change. With the melting ice a new reality is emerging for the Arctic region, resulting in its increased international profile as the ecological, environmental, economic, political, and societal changes have recast the region into a new light. Now players are envisioning new possibilities and revisiting old hopes for the region such as shorter shipping routes from Asia to Europe and North America. As the Arctic opens up, access to renewable and non-renewable resources is made possible. The economic dimensions of the region are great, and with these great interest naturally appears from near and far.

China is a prime example of a state looking north and rebranding itself to help fit into the emerging global governance structures and dialogues developing

¹ Original quote: ”Er det nu ikke på tide, at vi efter 300 års samvær, hvoraf størstedelen
around the region in the past couple of decades. China’s efforts to put itself into Arctic politics is most clearly evident with its declaration that it is a near-Arctic state and an Arctic stakeholder (Peoples Republic of China, 2018). With China being a major global power, and Greenland being a part of their vision of an Ice Silk Road, the Kingdom of Denmark faces new challenges and opportunities. Greenland is the reason why the Kingdom of Denmark declared itself a “major Arctic power” (Taksøe 2016), and Greenland is very important to Danish foreign and security policy (Government of Denmark, 2017). At the same time, a majority of the people of Greenland want independence, and they see Chinese investments as a tool to help finance their goal (Rasmussen and Merkelsen, 2017).

The present state of Greenlandic-Danish relations plays a key part in the vision that Greenland has for its future, as both Greenland and Denmark struggle to put the colonial past behind them. This struggle is most evident in the persistence of a parent-child relationship between the two nations, even though Greenland obtained self-rule in 2009 and thus became a nation of its own and equal to Denmark in the perspective of international law. Despite this equal status to Denmark in international law, Greenland is a part of the Kingdom of Denmark and subject to Denmark’s foreign and security policies as well as some other aspects that are charted from the central government in Copenhagen.

The complex, and at times emotionally laden, relationship between Greenland and Denmark does not become easier with jurisprudential disputes, the economic prospects of a long sought independence, and a large foreign power showing its interest. This thesis delves into how diverging perceptions of the Chinese interest in Greenland influence the Greenlandic-Danish relations. The central research question is:

*How is the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland impacting the relationship between Greenland and Denmark?*

In addressing this question, this thesis argues that security concerns are at the heart of how the Chinese interest in Greenland and the Arctic is being interpreted by Denmark. These security concerns, though to some extent shared by Greenlanders, diverge from Greenland’s overall concerns over its future
which appear to center around the issue of independence and as a result, Greenland has had a different interpretation of China’s interest in Greenland and the implications of entering into business relationships with the Asian state.

In order to answer the research question, this thesis draws on the literature of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. Securitization theory operates with *speech acts* which is a concept that describes how an issue can be securitized via the way it is talked about by a securitizing actor, thereby allowing for extraordinary means to be a part of the solution. Denmark is in a dilemma between its obligations to support Greenland’s right to govern itself and its deep rooted interest in maintaining the unity of the Kingdom, which would mean to keep Greenland within its influence in some way, such as limiting the extent of its independence (Gad, 2017). It is very much in Denmark’s interest to remain a ‘major Arctic power’, and only by keeping Greenland within the realm it can do so (Breum, 2013).

Securitization theory offers a frame within which one can interpret the strategy as set forth by the Danish and Greenlandic politicians. The analysis shows how there is a constant struggle between the respective governments of Denmark and Greenland as to whether or not an issue should be securitized or not. By securitizing issues that affect Greenland, Denmark risks being perceived as having a post-colonial behaviour and pushing the Greenlanders towards a quicker secession (Gad, 2017). By not securitizing Denmark fears that China may gain too much influence over the small society, which would have implications for Denmark’s foreign and security policy as well for the long term interests of the people of Greenland whom they are presently tasked with protecting from foreign threats. Greenland does not have an interest in Denmark securitizing their politics. A successful securitization could risk putting resources they see as potentially financing their path toward full autonomy back under Danish control and move them further away from their desire of independence.

In the analytical approach undertaken to answer the research question there is a number of sub-questions that need to be addressed. Those are:

- What is the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland?
• What is the relationship between Greenland and Denmark?
• What are the Danish and Greenlandic perceptions of the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland, respectively?

The first two sub-questions will be answered in the background chapters. The first sub-question serves to document that there is a Chinese interest in Greenland. It also serves to show the extent of the Chinese interest. The second sub-question addresses the focus on change in the research question. The research question asks how the relationship between Denmark and Greenland is impacted by China, hence changed. To study change, one needs to know the point of departure – that being the status in the relationship between the two nations in the Kingdom. The answers to the first two sub-questions build mainly on literature reviews of existing academic work and are supplemented with knowledge extracted from interviews with experts.

The third sub-question forms the first part of the analysis. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part shows how the Danish and Greenlandic governments perceive the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. The answer to this sub-question is important because the difference in the perception of the Chinese investments influences the relationship between the two countries. The official perceptions also partly answers the research question itself – by showing how the two nations differ in their perception of Chinese investments and by showing that the issue is of great importance to both nations – it also points to the Achilles heel in the relationship between the two countries.

The second part of the analysis studies the change in the relationship between Denmark and Greenland. This is done via two empirical studies. The first of these cases concerns a naval base that was pulled off the market due to a Chinese company bid, and the second case concerns the Chinese interest in the Greenlandic minerals. These two cases have been chosen because the Danish government in both cases took concrete action on the Chinese interest in Greenland. I do not go as far as claiming that they are representative for all relations between Denmark and Greenland. Nor do I compare the actions of the Danish government in the two cases. Rather they highlight the change in the
relationship between Greenland and Denmark, because Denmark (feels forced to) act even though Denmark normally go to great lengths to keep out of Greenlandic affairs as will be shown in the background chapters. The Danish actions in the two empirical cases and the Greenlandic reaction to the Danish actions highlight the altered nature of the relationship between the two countries and thus answers the research question.

Road Map

To address the central research question, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter one sets the frame for the analysis by presenting the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. Chapter two presents and discusses the two methodologies applied in this thesis: discourse analysis and content analysis. The third chapter provides the background for understanding the Danish-Greenlandic relationship. It presents a brief history and goes on to discuss the status of the relationship as of today. Chapter four provides background knowledge of China’s interest in the Arctic as a whole and in Greenland specifically. It also looks into the nature of Chinese diplomacy and the way it applies to the Arctic region. In Chapter five the Greenlandic and Danish governments’ official perspectives on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland are analysed, respectively. This is followed by two empirical cases in the sixth chapter. One about the naval base, Grønnedal, which was withdrawn from the market after a Chinese company made a bid. The other about the Greenlandic minerals, something that China is very interest in and that the Greenlanders perceive as a possible means to independence. The seventh and final chapter is the conclusion and bibliography.
Chapter One – Setting the Frame

Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School

The 21st century is characterized by the increased securitization of political affairs. In the emerging Arctic region the securitization effect is very apparent. To understand what securitization is, and what it means for the regional politics, this chapter assesses the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. It begins by presenting the Copenhagen School’s concept of security and how it differs from more traditional approaches to security studies. It then presents what the school labels the ‘political sector’ and it is discussed how the insights of this sector apply to the two empirical cases of this thesis. The Chapter moves on to address the two main elements of the securitization theory: the speech act and the securitization act. The two elements are interconnected but each hold their own set of characteristics and problems and are thus dealt with separately. After presenting the theory and its use in this thesis, this section will address the main critiques of the Copenhagen school; its lack of focus on the audience, the too narrow speech act concept, its inconsistency in its use of social constructivism (See e.g. Huysmans, 1998, McSweeney, 1996, Hansen, 2000). While recognizing the critique, the securitization theory is still applied as an analytical framework for the thesis because it offers a widened security concept that is ideal for analysing non-military threats, which is the case in this thesis.

A Widened Security Concept

The Copenhagen School originates from the former Conflict and Peace Research Institute that was located in Copenhagen (Huysmans, 1998). The Copenhagen School was pioneered by the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (Emmers, 2007, Buzan et al., 1998, van Munster, 2014). The School is acknowledged for its development of a body of concepts for understanding and widening the notion of security in a new way in the post cold war era (Buzan et al., 1998, Buzan, 1991). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde criticise the narrow focus on military security within the traditionalist position while acknowledging the concern that a widened security concept can make the concept lose its coherence. To them, and many other sceptics of the traditional position, the
narrow focus on military security started to waver during the Cold War (Buzan et al., 1998). The Copenhagen School literature proposes that a solution to the problem of widening the security concept without watering down the meaning of security is to link the act of securitization to the articulation of an existential threat. This enables the Copenhagen School to link a widened security concept to the traditional concept of survival (Buzan et al., 1998). This way the security concept preserves its original meaning while the application of it is broadened beyond military threats (Emmers, 2007).

Within the framework of a widened security concept, especially Ole Wæver succeeded in developing a securitization theory. The concept was originally formulated in 1995 in *Securitization and desecuritization* by Ole Wæver (Stritzel, 2014, van Munster, 2014). Wæver’s work was elaborated more systematically in *Security – a new framework for analysis* in 1998 by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. Although written 20 years ago, the latter still stands as the most thorough treatment of the concept by the Copenhagen School itself (van Munster, 2014).

**The Political Sectors**

The Copenhagen School studies the dynamics of security in five different non-exclusive sectors – military, environmental, economic, societal and political (Buzan et al., 1998). Their definition of sectors relies on the definition set forth by Buzan in his 1991 book *People, states and fear*. He looks at sectors as specific types of interaction, human collectivities, that are guided by factors that can be subdivided into the above mentioned sectors (Buzan, 1991). The authors of the Copenhagen School argue that sectors are not ontologically separate realms. The use of sectors is only an analytical tool that is helpful because it is a lens that simplifies the complexities of that which is being analysed. It does so because the securitizing players themselves would be categorising certain issues as economic or political and referring to these catagories in a speech act (Buzan et al., 1998). The sectors hold distinctive patterns that are a part of a greater whole. They thus reduce the number of variables at play (Buzan et al., 1998).

Although Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde make it clear in their book that an analysis does not start by looking at a sector, it is worth mentioning how they
perceive the security dynamics of the political sector, as the puzzle of this thesis lies within the political sector.

The political sector is defined as “Internal and external security threats against the state, political order, and democratic decision-making procedures” (Buzan et al. 1998, 142–43). It is thus about the organizational stability of social orders. While military threats belong to the military sector and threats to nationhood or religion belong to the societal sector, the political sector is a residual sector (Buzan et al., 1998). Buzan defines the threats to the political sector in the following way:

“Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particular its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal targets of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so, if the target is a weak state” (Buzan, 1991:118-19).

Every sector holds one or more referent objects that can be framed as existentially threatened. The referent object can be anything of major value to the audience; that being the state itself, groups, national sovereignty, ideology, economy or the like (Emmers, 2007). In the political sector the referent object is most typically the state/government, but it can be other types of political units, structures, processes and inter-unit institutions. Political threats are threats to the internal legitimacy of the referent object (ideologies, constitutive ideas and issues defining the state) or the external recognition of the state. In the end, it is about the sovereignty of the state. Anything that can be portrayed as a violation of sovereignty (an intervention) can be presented as a security issue. The stability of state-structures and undermining of state-carrying national or state ideologies are existential threats related to the political sector. The main linkages in this sector are principles rather than power (Buzan et al., 1998).

**The Speech Act**

Securitization theory offers a new take on the post Cold War debate about whether international security threats are objective (really constitute a threat to
international security) or subjective (what is perceived to be a threat) (van Munster, 2014). The Copenhagen School sidesteps this debate by changing the focus from whether a threat is real or not and instead focus on a speech act. A speech act is the way an issue can be socially constructed as a threat (van Munster, 2014, Stritzel, 2014). The idea of a speech act originates in philosophy and refers to the idea that by saying something, something is done (van Munster, 2014). The classic examples are baptizing or promising something. Here it is the utterance itself, that is a performance of something (Stritzel, 2014).

The securitizing speech act is defined as a “discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential threat to security” (Emmers, 2007:112). Buzan et al. argues that the way to study securitization is through analysing rhetoric and discourse; “By saying security a state representative declares an emergency condition” (Buzan et al., 1998:21). A securitization is successful if an argument about an issue as being existentially threatened gains enough acceptance among its audience to make them tolerate violations of the rules, the securitizing actor would otherwise be bound by. The argument should also contain notions of priority and urgency for it to be a securitizing move (Buzan et al., 1998). A securitizing move is the utterance from a securitizing actor. It not a securitization until the audience have accepted the move (Buzan et al., 1998).

Buzan et al. build their securitizing speech acts on John L. Austin’s metaphor of speech act theory (Stritzel, 2014, Buzan et al., 1998). Austin argues that a speech act consists of three elements (Austin, 1962):

1. Locution – The act of saying something
2. Illocution – The act in saying something (the performance in the utterance)
3. Perlocution – The consequence or effect of the utterance on the audience

Wæver argues that securitization is an illocutionary act in relation to security (Wæver, 1989). This means, that by saying the word ‘security’, a state representative is performing an act that allows for emergency measures to be taken. The act itself thus lies in the utterance.
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde emphasize again and again, that to study securitization is to study discourse and rhetoric. In their 1998 book *Security: a Framework for Analysis* Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde exemplify how to use securitization theory on a case. Here Buzan et al. use discourse analysis arguing that “discourse is studied as a subject in its own right, not as an indicator of something else... the purpose of discourse analysis is not to get at something else” (Buzan et al., 1998:176-77). Here, and in other passages of the book, Buzan et al. emphasize the clear focus on the illocutionary part of the speech act.

Until recently, Wæver and the rest of the Copenhagen School paid little attention to the audience, other than mentioning their acceptance as a precondition to the success of the securitization act (Stritzel, 2014). Stritzel criticizes Wæver and the Copenhagen School in general for being too loose in their drawing on Austin’s illocutionary category. Stritzel argues, that by putting more and more focus on the audience and the facilitating conditions in their later work, they move towards a perlocutionary focus (Stritzel, 2014). The focus on the audience as decisive for a successful speech act is contradicting the theory’s focus on discourse and illocution alone in its analytical framework.

Thierry Balzacq (2005) shows in his article how an effective securitization is actually audience-centered. The focus on the context and preconditions of the perlocution aspect of securitization is crucial for the securitization move to be successful. The speaker should, according to Balzacq, tune his language into audience’s experience and try to resonate his “speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying [her/his] ways with [her/his]” (Balzacq, 2005:184). By creating stereotypes and being strategic in his communication, the speaker is more likely to succeed in his securitization move (Balzacq, 2005). As discussed above, the Copenhagen School has in recent years started to pay more attention to what it takes for the audience to be convinced. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) mention context and ‘facilitating conditions’ for a speech act to become securitization. These facilitating conditions include the position of authority for the securitizing actor. The relationship between the actor and the audience is defining for the likelihood of the audience to accept the securitizing message (Buzan et al., 1998).
Securitization

Buzan et al. (1998) state that “securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.” (Buzan et al., 1998:25). For an issue or subject to be securitized, a securitizing actor takes an issue out of the normal political agenda using rhetoric of existential threat to a referent object. The securitizing actors are often the governments in strong states. That said, it can also be transnational movements, institutions or strong societal-political leaders, particularly in the cases of states with weaker state structures. By referring to a reference object as being existentially threatened, the securitizing actor gives the issue a sense of urgency and a priority. This legitimizes that the issue is taken out of the normal political system where it would otherwise be bound by procedures and rules. The existential threat calls for extraordinary measures. This rhetoric performed by a securitizing actor is called a securitizing move. Buzan et al. argue that if the audience is convinced by the securitization move, it is a securitization (Buzan et al., 1998).

The social construction of securitization is thus built on a collective understanding of a threat, not an individual one (Emmers, 2007). Securitization theory outlines how a specific issue can move back and forth on a spectrum from non-politicized to politicized and securitized in the end. The movement from securitized and back to politicized is called desecuritization. (Emmers, 2007). When an issue is non-politicized it is characterized by not being subject to public debate or coped with by the state. A politicized issue is managed within the normal political system and resources are allocated towards it. When an issue is securitized it is framed as a security issue through an act of securitization, and a securitizing actor frames an already politicized issue as an existential threat to a referent object (Emmers, 2007:112). The boundaries between the politicized and the securitized are blurred. When securitization is defined as an extreme version of the political there is confusion and possible overlap along the spectrum. (Emmers, 2007, Stritzel, 2014).

Buzan et al. (1998) emphasise that extraordinary measures do not have to be adopted for the securitization to be successful, there only have to be:
“enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimate emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return and necessity” (Buzan et al., 1998:25).

Extraordinary means are defined as means that go beyond the established and ordinary norms of the political domain. Extraordinary means are above normal politics (Emmers, 2007, Buzan et al., 1998, Stritzel, 2014).

Securitization thus consists of two moves:

1. The speech act (use of security language by a powerful actor)
2. The actor succeeds in convincing relevant audience (public opinion, politicians, military officers, other elites) that a reference object is existentially threatened. → Extraordinary measures CAN be imposed (Emmers, 2007:111-12)

**Security as Silence**

The politicized-securitized nexus becomes even more difficult when there is not a speech act present but still an act of securitization. As outlined above, an issue is on the non-politicized part of the spectrum, when it is not a part of the public debate. Lene Hansen (2000) shows how the epistemological reliance on the speech act theory is a problem in situations where speech is not possible. This can be due to a risk of danger for a person to vocalize the issue (as e.g. in some totalitarian regimes) or a political judgment that it is not beneficial to a security issue that it becomes articulated in the public. Hansen characterizes the problem as ‘security as silence’ which, according to her, occurs when voicing a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced (Hansen, 2000). Another critique of the speech act is within its definition. Buzan et al. (1998) are criticized for being too narrow in their definition of a speech act by equating it to oral/written words. Discourse is not only present at the textual level. Lene Hansen (2000) and Michael C. Williams (2013) call for a broader definition encompassing non-verbal forms of speech/communication (Hansen, 2000, Williams, 2013).

Buzan et al. (1998) acknowledges the fact that there can be impediments to speech acts:
“some security practices are nor legitimized in public by security discourse, because they are not out in the public at all. (...) But this is actually a very clear case of the security logic. In a democracy, at some point it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore legitimately can be handled different (...) Not every act is presented with the drama of urgency and priority, because it has been established in a general sense that this is an entire field that has been moved to a form of treatment legitimate only because this area has been defined as security” (Buzan et al., 1998:28).

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) argue that a securitized situation can be institutionalized e.g. via intelligence services. The public then accepts that this is too important a security issue to be discussed in public. The securitized situation in this case thus lacks both the speech act as well as the emergency measures.

Intelligence services, for example, are a part of every state and are financed via the states’ national budgets. Their ‘extraordinary measures’ are not more extraordinary than they are still bound by rules and procedures set forth by the government – even if those rules and procedures are hidden from the public.

The best answer provided by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) is, that politicized issues are a part of the public debate, and the work of intelligence services is not.

**Social Constructivism**

Bill McSweeney (1996) criticize Buzan's use of ‘social identity' in *People, states and fear*. His main point is that the Copenhagen School contradicts itself by sometimes being constructivist and sometimes being realist in its perception of identity. He refers to it as “sociologically untenable” (McSweeney, 1996). He argues that the Copenhagen school “in effect have an objectivist theory with relativist consequences” (McSweeney, 1996:86). McSweeney shows how the school perceives identity and society as fixed. Due to their social constructivist ontology societies and identities cannot be judged from this position and this means that each society is allocated an objective identity (McSweeney, 1996). From this point of view, anything can be treated as a security issue and any form of violent, exclusionary or even fascist politics for example, must be treated just as objectively as any other speech act.
In *Security – A new framework for analysis*, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) respond to the critique by McSweeney and argue the case for securitization theory;

“We do take identities as socially constituted but not radically moreso [sic] than other social structures. Identity and other social structures can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. At specific points this “inert constructivism” enables modes of analysis very close to objectivist” (Buzan et al., 1998:205, authors’ emphasis).

The condition to this use of what they call ‘inert constructivism’ is that one remembers that in the final instance the ontology is constructivist (Buzan et al., 1998:205).

The authors of the Copenhagen School refer to themselves as both relative objectivists and radical constructivists. The advantages of this ontological gerrymandering (a term used by Huysmans (1998:495) about the ontology of the Copenhagen School) is that it ensures continuity in the objects that are being studied and at the same time opening up for change. The downside is that the theory cannot contest the meaning of security in terms of truth or falsity. The theory can only pragmatically or ethically ask what the likely effects of securitizing an issue will be (Buzan et al., 1998).

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde speak in favour of keeping issues desecuritized. The critique of the Copenhagen School’s implicitly approving more radical views is thus false. By preferring issues not to be securitized they are kept within the state’s normal handling of political issues and the Copenhagen School does not speak in favour of extraordinary means to be applied. The fact that a securitization requires the acceptance of the speech act from the audience in order for it to be successful means that there is a barrier for more radical means when dealing with the issue. As with all other politics, security rests not with the object nor with the subjects but *among* the subjects.

**Conclusion**

The securitization theory focuses on the utterance of security and emergency by a securitizing actor. More recent work within the school has increasingly been emphasising the role of the audience. The theory, and especially the part on the political sector, can be used to study how the increased
Chinese interest in the Arctic makes the Danish government relate to issues such as the sovereignty, (economic) intervention and stability of political institutions.

The above section has also outlined the most common critique of the theory and its implications on the role of the analyst. By keeping the normative and ethical perspectives in mind and widening the speech act concept to more than spoken words, but also to actions and institutions, this thesis takes into account the gravest part of the critique.
Chapter Two - Methods and Data Collection

Situated within securitization theory and its focus on speech acts, this thesis applies a combination of content analysis and discourse analysis as its methodology. This chapter elaborates on the methods and data collection techniques used in this thesis. It serves to show how the thesis’s research question can be translated into research practice.

The empirical data that is the foundation of this thesis was collected from a variety of official documents and news articles. While both discourse analysis and content analysis often use documents as sources of data, they differ in one major respect: Within the field of content analysis, documents are analysed in the context in which they are published, and the researcher should be aware of the agenda of the publisher, the implied readership, the separate reality and intertextuality of the documents (Bryman, 2012). This focus on context and all the conditions outside the document is not present in discourse analysis where one reads the document in its own right. The official documents are studied in their context and as a part of a greater whole and are thus subject to content analysis.

In addition to using text sources, three semi-structured interviews were also conducted for this thesis. The methodological considerations regarding the interviews, documents and the news sources are outlined in the “Data Collection” section below.

The interviews and the quotes taken from news articles as well as singled out passages from the official documents are subject to a discourse analysis, meaning that they are analysed in their own right and not as a representation of something else. Below, content analysis and discourse analysis are operationalized as methodologies, and the role of the types of the empirical data is discussed. Along the line it is shown how the methodologies interact with securitization theory.
Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is chosen as a methodology because of the securitization theory’s focus on speech acts. The authors of the Copenhagen School also argue for using discourse analysis;

“The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat. The defining criterion of security is textual: A specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse” (Buzan et al., 1998:176).

Discourse analysis like the Copenhagen School is social constructivist in its epistemology. Language, understood in a broad sense, is the medium that gives objects and phenomena their meaning (Hansen, 2009). By interpreting language, naming issues and enacting thereof reality is *produced* (Austin, 1962, Medby, 2017). This does not mean that there does not exist a reality outside of discourse or that everything is language. It merely means that we always have to pay attention to our position within a certain discourse and that objective reality only can be understood via our own interpretation. The overall idea is that the *truth* or what we *know* is shaped by language, history, culture and social processes (Rasborg, 2009).

Operationalization

While widely used in the social sciences, discourse analysis is operationalized in multiple ways (Hansen, 2009). When applying securitization theory which was developed by Ole Wæver, it is natural to apply Wæver’s operationalization of discourse analysis as well. Wæver explains how to use poststructuralist discourse analysis as a foreign policy method in "Identity, communities and foreign policy” (Wæver, 2002). According to Wæver it offers explanations of both continuity and change – but only at the overall foreign policy level. Overall foreign policies involve the question on how communities project themselves into the future. They articulate a narrative that holds a vision on how *this* foreign policy is moving ‘us’ in the right direction in the future. If such an articulation is unconvincing the policy becomes unstable and change is imminent (Wæver, 2002).
Discourse analysis works on official documents exactly because they are statements of visions. Discourse analysis does not try to get to the motives or thoughts by the actors, which, according to Wæver is a strength, because much is hidden in foreign policy. It is thus a huge methodological advantage that one stays at the level of discourse. By using sources for what they are, and not as indicators of something else the conclusions becomes much clearer (Wæver, 2002).

Wæver draws on Michel Foucault in his approach to operationalizing discourse analysis. According to Foucault in “The Archaeology of Knowledge” discourse is a precondition for statements. Though the discourse sets the rules for what can and cannot be said, it is not possible to study the discourse outside the statements. The purpose of a discourse analysis is not to study the meaning of words, but to study how they become objects of the discourse (Foucault, 1972). Discourses are made of different statements and what makes for the unity and coherence of a discourse is simply the regularities exhibited by the relations between different statements (Wæver, 2002). The purpose of the discourse analysis for this thesis is thus not to study the semantics of the certain words like “security” or “emergency”, but how these words are objects for something bigger – the securitization move.

Language is not seen as a transparent medium, a referent that names objects out there in reality. Rather, discourse analysis works from a differential understanding of language. Meaning is located in the difference among concepts, and language is a system the structure of which we can study as a separate stratum of reality. Language is not everything, Wæver adds, the world does consist of more than language and its meaning systems, but discourse organize knowledge systematically and delimits what can and can not be said (Wæver, 2002).

Operationalizing Wæver’s take on discourse analysis is to look at the language system as layered. Change can occur in one layer and not in others, and the discourse theory can thus explain both consistency and change in foreign policy. Pressure on the ability to deal with perceived problems will force discourses to change. The degree of change is depending on the inability of the
discourse in one or more layers. The layers are drawn from theory and knowledge about the subject studied. The first layer is the most general one, adding specifications for each layer studied (Wæver, 2002:32).

In this thesis, concepts from securitization theory will be applied to the discourse analysis. If the current security discourse is insufficient to deal with the case of China’s interest for investing in Greenland and how it affects the relationship between Greenland and Denmark, we will see a change in one or more layers of the discourse and hence the foreign policy on the issue.

**Content Analysis**

Content analysis is a method of analysing text data. It is subject to a wide range of definitions, and the one employed in this thesis is Klaus Krippendorff’s. Krippendorff defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences for texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2014:18). With a background in the naturalistic paradigm, the methodology of content analysis assigns a systematic way of approaching texts. There is a large breath in the analytical approach one can take to systematically analyse text data. It ranges from the impressionistic and intuitive to strict textual analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). What they have in common, and what makes them all a part of the same method, is the way these analysis are conducted. Content analysis requires that the analyst is very explicit in his/her arguments and very systematic when approaching the text (Krippendorff, 2014).

Simply put, content analysis means looking for meaning in texts or other “message carrying matter”² such as pictures and movies. For the sake of simplicity, the term “text” will from here on be employed to all message carrying matter. All texts are produced by someone to have meaning to someone else. What exactly is meant by meaning has been discussed and developed over the years (Krippendorff, 2014). Krippendorff’s definition employed in this thesis and presented above is allowing for the researcher bringing his or her own

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² “Message carrying matter” is a phrase used by Krippendorff (2014)
experiences into play, as long as they are accounted for. Krippendorff outlines three different takes on what “content” means (Krippendorff, 2014:19):

1. It can be inherent in the text
2. It can be a property of the source of a text
3. Or content can emerge in the process of a researcher analyzing a text relative to a particular context.

The last definition of context takes the contributions of the analyst into account. He or she makes contributions to what counts as content. These contributions can be concepts extracted from theories e.g. securitization theory in this thesis, but they can also be contextual, drawing on existing knowledge of the context where the text was produced.

Texts have no reader-independent qualities. To see a message implies that someone is trying to make meaning of it. Texts do not have one single meaning that could be found – rather the meanings that are invoked in texts are not necessarily shared by others. Texts are read with particular intents, and data are informative in relation to particular problems (Krippendorff, 2014).

These features of content analysis were first presented by Altheide who called his method “Ethnographic content analysis” (1987). Altheide acknowledges the theory driven content analysis but allows for the analyst to get involved in the text and for new concepts to emerge while working with the texts. In this understanding, the analyst becomes a part of the context that the text is analysed in. To Altheide (1987) analysing documents is a reflective movement between concept developments, sampling, data collection, data analysis and interpretation. It is a constant comparison and draws on and collect narrative data rather than forcing the data into predefined categories (Altheide, 1987).

Bringing the discussion back to securitization theory, I look for concepts in the documents that work with the theory and its way of framing the securitization of situations and issues. This way the theory guides what to look for and thus provides a point of view. In the next section I shall go into more detail on how the method of content analysis is operationalized in this thesis.
Operationalization

Operationalizing content analysis in this thesis will be done by applying a summative approach to official government reports in the first part of the analysis. The summative content analysis is characterized by starting with identifying and quantifying certain words and passages in the government documents. This is done to explore the usage of the words in their context (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).

In the part of the analysis that explores the official Danish take on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland, the usage of the words “China” and “Greenland” will be accounted for. Also the length of the passages evolving around China and the Arctic will be quantified. If the analysis stopped at this point, it would be a quantitative content analysis focused on counting specific manifest content. A summative analysis goes beyond this manifest analysis and interprets the latent content (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). By studying the frequency of these words and the length of the passages surrounding them, patterns can be identified. If the usage of specific words is increasing in government reports over the years, it tells a story of the issue growing in perceived importance.

After accounting for the manifest content, the usage of the words and the passages on China in the Arctic are interpreted in terms of the latent message included. This involves taking the context of the reports into account, i.e. the publisher, the intended readership and the intertextuality of the documents (Bryman, 2012). As the answers to these questions are not always known to the analyst, context will often be the analyst’s best hypothesis of how they came to be, what they mean and what the purpose of them is (Krippendorff, 2014). At the end of this process, individually selected passages of the documents will be subjected to a simple discourse analysis as outlined above. Here, again, the search will focus on speech acts and securitization moves. A short discussion on how content analysis and discourse analysis interplay in a method triangulation will be presented in the below section.

When conducting a content analysis, as with most other qualitative methods, extra attention should be paid to reliability and validity (Bryman,
The techniques must be reliable. This means that techniques used must be replicable for researchers working under different circumstances. In terms of validity, the results of the analysis must stand after close scrutiny, and claims be upheld on independently available evidence. In this thesis reliability and validity is assured by being extra attentive to being explicit in the methodological approach as well as approaching the findings from multiple angles. This is done via triangulation of data as well as methods which are discussed below.

Data Collection

The data collection started with more general background reading on the Danish-Greenlandic history and relationship. While creating an understanding of the primary issues between the Denmark and Greenland this also helped guide the case selection. The background reading often referred to specific events where the problems with the Chinese interest in Greenland were especially outspoken. It was thus the background reading that led to the first media sources on the two empirical cases. Later, this media search was extended with a search through the media archive, infomedia.dk. Here, specific key terms were used as guides for the search. These included “Grønnedal” (the naval base), “Uran” (uranium), “Shenghe Resources” (the name of a major Chinese investing company) and “GME” (Greenland Minerals and Energy – the holder of the extraction license to Kvanefjeld, which is one of the largest mining spots in Greenland).

As I do not read Greenlandic, all the searches but one were conducted in Danish. for the exception was “Kangilirninguit“, which is the Greenlandic word for Grønnedal, and which I included in a media search that counted a number of articles related to Grønnedal in Danish and Greenlandic Media. All the Greenlandic media used in this thesis post articles in Greenlandic as well as Danish, so generally it has not been a problem for me to access and analyze the Greenlandic news articles. The Danish news media chosen were the webpages of five major and countrywide newspapers: information.dk, jyllands-posten.dk, berlingske.dk, kristeligt-dagblad.dk and politiken.dk. The Greenlandic news media search was conducted on common website of the only two countrywide
newspapers (Sermitsiaq and Atuagagdiutit/Grønlandsposten): sermitsiaq.ag as well as the Greenlandic national broadcasting company's website knr.gl. In the searches conducted in relation to the Grønnedal case, the timeframe was set to 1st December 2017 till 5th August 2018. This timeframe ranges from just before the news on the case broke till the day the analysis was finished.

The primary stage of data collection (and the subsequent analysis of discourse) consisted of key policy documents relating to Denmark's Arctic policies. The key documents consist of a report called *The Future Missions of the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Arctic* (FMMDA) and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) public risk assessments, which are published yearly and are analyzed for the period 2010-2017. The FMMDA report was two years underway and is an extensive analysis of the Danish Arctic policy. The conclusions of the report were later transformed into Denmark's official Arctic policy. The DDIS reports are not directly representations of the Danish government, but as they are issued by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, which is under the authority of the Minister of Defence they can still be counted as portraying the official Danish perception of the Chinese interest in Greenland.

The second stage was the search for key Greenlandic official documents that could tell about the Greenlandic perception of the Chinese interest. No documents were found that addressed the Chinese interest solely. Rather, the government reports highlighted the need for foreign investment in general. The documents analyzed in this thesis are *Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018* and *How can growth and welfare in Greenland be secured?* (2010). Though the latter report is eight years old, it is still relevant today, because it is drafted by a tax and welfare commission that was established by the Greenlandic government to examine the best possible way for the future of the Greenlandic welfare society (Naalakkersuisut, 2010). The former report is relevant because investments in oil and minerals are perceived as the most likely way for Greenland to become independent – their ultimate goal, as the background chapters will show. In addition to these two reports, statements from the Greenlandic government website naalakkersut.gl are used as data on the official perception of China as well.
Lastly, as a supplement to the literature reviews of the background chapters interviews with three experts were conducted. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way to allow for the interviewees to emphasize what they deemed most important with regard to the topic of the interview. At the same time, the semi-structured nature of the interviews ensured that they addressed the issues where I found that the interviewees personally could add to the existing academic literature used in this thesis. The interviews were conducted in Danish. The interviewees were chosen as experts in their respective fields: Greenlandic politics (Aleqa Hammond), scientific research on China in the Arctic (Camilla T. N. Sørensen) and Danish defence policy in the Arctic (Nils Wang). As such they each contributed with important insights from their respective fields of expertise and were able to elaborate on issues related to this thesis as well as guide my further research.

The first person interviewed was Camilla T. N. Sørensen. Sørensen is an assistant professor at the Danish Defence Academy and she has lived 20 years in China. Her main field of research is related to Danish foreign and security policy, the Arctic and China. The second interviewee is Nils Wang. At the time of the interview he was rear admiral in the Danish Navy and had served as head of the Royal Danish Navy and was as such responsible for the naval ships operating in the Arctic. He is one of the leading Arctic security experts in Denmark. At last the former premier of Greenland, Aleqa Hammond, was interviewed. She added knowledge on the Greenlandic perception of Chinese investments as well as the Greenlandic perspectives on the future of the Kingdom.

**Methods and Data Triangulation**

This thesis triangulates the data abstracted from the content and discourse analysis of government documents and news sources with the interview data. The interviews were conducted in order to make experts from different fields elaborate on the findings from the academic literature review. The interviews helped enlighten the answer to the research questions from multiple points of view. The picture created when data collection methods are triangulated provides a fuller picture of the phenomena and verifies and validates the consistency of the research findings (Rothbauer, 2008).
Triangulation of data thus contributes to the thesis’ internal validity.

Similarly, at the methodological level, there is a triangulation between content analysis and discourse analysis. While they seem opposite in the way they treat the context of the texts, they can supplement each other with insights from both methodologies. Discourse is not seen as a representation of something else – rather, as outlined above, discourse is studied in itself. This gives insight into what is actually said and how issues are handled. When the two methods are triangulated they provide insights that neither of them could bring forward when used solely. For example, the use of content analysis helps us understand the context of the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland, and discourse analysis helps us understand how that interest is articulated.

It is also in the discourse analysis that a change in the articulation of the issue would be identified. Content analysis is dependent on the context, and the reports used in this research will be read as representing the official take of the governments of the two nations on the Chinese interest for investing in Greenland. Here, the focus on the context serves to bring the latent message forward. Whereas discourse analysis can help identify a change in articulation, content analysis can help answer why this change has occurred.

Triangulation of these two methods thus enhances the understanding of different dimension related to the research question. The research question “How is the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland impacting the relationship between Denmark and Greenland?” While both methods can contribute to the overall answer of the research question, discourse analysis is particularly good at identifying how the relationship of the two nations is impacted, and content analysis is good at explaining why.

Concluding Notes on the Methodological Considerations

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue in favour of the use of discourse analysis when looking for speech acts. The method is helpful in identifying security paradigms and changes in them. Content analysis will provide insights into the
contexts of these changes and thus help answer the question “why the relationship between the Denmark and Greenland is changing”

This chapter has shown how the social constructivist approach to discourse analysis and content analysis to a wide extent is dependent on the analyst. As this thesis is investigating the change in the relationship between two nations where I, as the analyst and author, belong to one of them, there is a clear potential for bias. By keeping this potential bias in my analysis present, my aim is to avoid its manifestation in the conclusions that I draw. My role here is to analyse.
Chapter Three – The Danish-Greenlandic History and Relationship

This chapter aims at providing the background for the Danish-Greenlandic relations. This overview is needed for the analysis of the influence of the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland on Danish-Greenlandic relations that is addressed in the two cases explored in Chapter six.

To explore how the increased Chinese interest in Greenland changes the relationship between Greenland and Denmark, it is necessary to know what the relationship was. Though the relationship between the two nations is complex, emotionally laden and not least disputed all the way down to whether Greenland was a Danish colony at all, this section will try to look at the broad picture. First a brief historical overview is offered. This overview is followed by a discussion of the relationship of the two nations as well as what the two nations mean for each other.

Danish-Greenlandic Relations: A Brief History

The first Europeans to set foot on the world’s largest island were Norwegian and Icelandic Vikings lead by the Norwegian, Erik den Røde (Erik the Red), in 982. With them a period of more than 400 years of Scandinavian settlement started in Greenland (Breum, 2014). The Scandinavians and the Inuit lived, fought and traded with each other until the last Scandinavian settler succumbed or fled the island, most likely due to the harsh climate in the beginning of the 15th century (Kuijpers et al., 2014). The last reference of the Scandinavians Vikings in Greenland is a written attestation of a wedding between Sigríður Björnsdóttir and Þorsteinn Ólafsson in 1408 in Hvalsay Church (Sjøgren, 2014). For the next 300 years, the Inuit lived more or less isolated from the outside world only to be sporadically visited by English and Dutch whalers (Breum, 2014). The Inuit were probably unaware that formally they went from Norwegian governance to Danish governance during this time period. The Norwegian crown formed a union with Denmark, which lasted from 1380 until 1814. Greenland remained a part of the Danish kingdom after the Treaty of Kiel
absolved the union between the Danish and Norwegian crowns (Treaty of Kiel, 1814).

In 1721, the missionary Hans Egede travelled to Greenland by royal appointment to christen the Scandinavian settlers. Little did he or the Danish crown know, that Scandinavian settlers had vanished from Greenland 300 years previously. As there were no Scandinavians to christen, Hans Egede decided to christen the Greenlanders. With him a new era of Scandinavian interest and influence emerged in Greenland (Sørensen, 2015). In the 18th century Greenland was essentially a whaling and fishing hub and a place where Danish explorers travelled to do anthropological and geological research (Breum, 2013).

In the early twentieth century the Danish sovereignty over Greenland was disputed. Some states, like Canada, clearly recognized the Danish sovereignty. In the beginning of the century Canada showed an interest in buying Greenland from Denmark, and later on they tried to obtain the right to first refusal if Denmark should choose to sell Greenland (Burke, 2018).

Other states such as the United States and Norway were less willing to recognize the Danish sovereignty over the whole of the island. The Danish activities on the island had predominantly been on the west coast and Norway claimed sovereignty over the east coast. Norway took the dispute to the International Court in Hague and lost (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1933). The United States were reluctant to recognize Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland due to the Monroe Doctrine’s objection to further European colonization in the Western Hemisphere and for more strategic reasons (Berry, 2016). The United States also considered buying Greenland, but ended up buying The Danish West Indies in exchange for 25 mill dollars and a statement saying “the government of the United States of America will not object to the Danish government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland” in 1916 (Berry, 2016).
During the Second World War, Denmark was occupied by Germany but Greenland was left as an unoccupied territory. This made Denmark allow American military presence on Greenland to make sure Greenland stayed under Danish rule while Denmark was occupied. The American presence served to safeguard Greenland from German occupation and alternatively Canadian or British preventive occupation (Sørensen, 2015). In 1951 the defence relationship between the United States and Denmark was formalized and became permanent in the Defence Agreement of 1951 (Forsvarsaftalen af 1951). In the Defence Agreement a de facto shared sovereignty over Greenland was established. The US was allowed to operate whenever and wherever it wanted on Greenland while staying out of Greenlandic affairs leaving Denmark with the de jure sovereignty.
over the island. (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Søby Kristensen, 2018b, Government of Denmark and Government of the United States of America, 1951). The Greenlanders were never heard in the matters regarding the presence of the American military on the island, and still to this day, the American presence on the island evokes reminiscences of the colonial past.

A former Greenlandic government official is quoted to have said the following about a concrete example of the American presence in Greenland:

"it [the Igaliku Agreement about the Thule base in 2004] benefited Terma in the USA, who got the billion dollar contract. We got nothing. In reality USA and Denmark made a deal with us as a front figure... Denmark used us in this case to promote their own interests"3 (Henriksen and Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017:28 My translation).

The quote shows, how in Greenland there is often a feeling of being left out on the deals between Denmark and USA. This creates a taboo between Denmark and Greenland, where the two nations are reluctant to discuss the strategic value of Greenland for Denmark because of a mistrust from the Greenlandic side and a fear of being perceived as a colonial power from the Danish side (Henriksen and Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017, Olesen, 2018).

**Greenland’s road from Colony to Self Government**

Historians disagree whether Greenland was a colony or not - at least in the traditional sense of the term (Baeré, 2018, Breum, 2014). In a legal sense there is not so much to dispute. The United Nations Charter from 1945 holds in its Chapter XI, Article 73 and 74 a declaration regarding non self-governing territories (UN, 1945). This declaration still guides the United Nations’ decolonization efforts today (United Nations, 2018).

The people of Greenland could not vote or run for elections to the Danish parliament before 1953, and Greenland was thus a non self-governing territory - a colony. What is disputed is the ‘traditional’ understanding of the term colony. Denmark did not take any Greenlandic slaves and did not oppress or exploit the

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3 Original quote: “Den gavvende Terma i USA, der fik milliardorder. Vi fik ingenting. I virkeligheden lavede USA og Danmark en aftale med os som frontfigur …. Danmark brugte os i denne sammenhæng til at fremme egne interesser”
natives for profit. In this sense the term does not seem to fit 1:1 on how Denmark treated the Greenlanders. Though Denmark did not act as the classic colonial master, the use of force on Greenlanders was present in multiple cases. One example of repression that is still haunting the Greenlanders is the case of a social experiment where the Danish state forcibly relocated children and kept them away from their parents as part of a social experiment (Burke, 2017). There was also some economic exploitation in the sense that Denmark had monopoly on the trade with Greenland from 1776 to 1908, but there was no great profit for Denmark (Sørensen, 2015).

There are those, however, that argue against the view that Greenland was ever a Danish colony. Thorkild Kjærgaard, an associate professor at Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland) in Nuuk from 2002-2015, is one of the historians who claim that Greenland was never a colony in the proper sense of the word. He argues, that to Denmark Greenland served two purposes: (1) the dream of a large empire and (2) the religious and altruistic purpose of spreading Christianity (Kjærsgaard, 2012). Most Greenlandic politicians and scholars, however, disagree. Most scholars writing about Greenland think of Greenland in terms of a former colony, though they do acknowledge that it cannot be compared with former African or Asian colonies (Breum, 2014).

For example, in 2014, the then premier of Greenland, Aleqa Hammond, formed a reconciliation commission with the purpose of creating a “greater awareness of our shared past [which] provides enhanced opportunities for building an inclusive and respectful society” (Reconciliation Commission, 2018). The need for a reconciliation commission was widely discussed in Denmark, where it gave associations to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The then prime minister in Denmark, Helle Thorning Smith, refused to have anything to do with it, even though Aleqa Hammond insisted that it only served the purpose of learning from the past in the name of creating a greater understanding and cohesion in the Greenlandic society (Heinrich, 2014).

The formal process to decolonize the Danish relationship with Greenland began in 1953 when Greenland was granted voting rights and two seats in the Danish parliament, Folketinget. The island obtained “home rule” (semi-
autonomy) in 1979. The calls for independence were voiced ever stronger, and in 2009 the Greenlandic population obtained “selfrule” with the Self Government Act. The Self Government Act meant that the people of Greenland were given responsibility for more policy areas and that they are allowed to declare independence and secede whenever there is a majority who wishes it.

There is still a limited number of policies that Greenland cannot decide on as long as they are a part of the Kingdom, the most important of them are foreign and security policies (Sørensen, 2015). Greenland is, however, allowed to pursue Greenlandic foreign policy goals as long as they are not contradictory to the overall foreign policy of the Kingdom of Denmark (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Søby Kristensen, 2018b). This has resulted in the establishment of Nuanut Allanut Naalakkersuisoqarfik – the ministry of foreign affairs - and Greenlandic representations in both Brussels and Washington. The Self Government Act also means that the Greenlandic people were recognized as a people in accordance with international law (Breum, 2014) (Government of Denmark, 2009)

**Tension Points in the Bilateral Relationship**

The main obstacle for an independent Greenland is economy. Greenland is still very dependent on the annual block grant from the Danish state which was 3,7 billion DKK in 2017 or what amounts to 55,7% of the total Greenlandic governments revenue (Ministry of Fianance, 2017). Furthermore, the block grant is pegged to the Danish inflation rate, which is lower than the Greenlandic inflation rate, meaning that the amount of money that the Greenlandic government receives from Denmark is de facto decreasing (Christensen, 2016a). This is adding to the pressure to grow and diversify the Greenlandic economy. For the Greenlanders, an attractive solution to this economic dependency is the possibility of new industrial opportunities, including oil and gas exploration, mineral extraction, tourism, and hydroelectric energy projects. Several foreign companies are investing in Greenlandic resource extraction. To mention a few; the Canadian company, Hudson Resources Inc., which is building infrastructure and searching for minerals in Naajat, Greenland Minereals & Energy (GME), that is searching for rare earth elements (REE), zink and uranium, at Kuannersuit and a handful of other investors and projects varying in size and purpose that are
also searching for one or more minerals in the Greenlandic soil (Mineral Licence and Safety Authority Greenland, 2017).

The foreign investors and their search for rare or high risk minerals create some tension in Copenhagen, as the governments in Nuuk and Copenhagen disagree about who has authority over which policy areas (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2018).

The relationship between the two nations is often referred to as a parent-child relationship (see e.g. Gad, 2008, Thomsen, 1998). The metaphor is describing the economic and socially unequal situation, where the parent (Denmark) protects and supports the child (Greenland). This imagery also allows for Denmark to have had a colony, because it protects the Danish self-perception as benevolent (Gad, 2017). The infantilization of Greenland often causes great frustration for the people of Greenland who react either with silence or rejection. The Greenlandic politician Juliane Henningsen (IA) has said the following about the Danish-Greenlandic relationship: “Of course paternalistic talk is of no use to us. But the exchange of knowledge, the design of solutions and an offer of cooperation we can (...) use very, very much”4 (As quoted in Gad, 2008:128 My translation). In the interview with Camilla T. N. Sørensen she points to the fact that Denmark can not take back policy areas that are already transferred to the Greenlandic authority. What Denmark can do is to make Greenland aware of Danish expertise in given policy areas and hope that Greenland will make use of them (Sørensen, 2018a). Sørensen and Henningsen thus seem to agree that greater cooperation and exchange of knowledge is to the benefit of both countries. In the interview with Aleqa Hommond she voices that the cooperation between the two countries needs to be more equal than today, where, according to her, Denmark wants Greenland to “beg” for investments. She too emphasizes that it would of the benefit for both countries to cooperate more, as Greenland is moving towards independence, and the only way Denmark can benefit from Greenlandic independence is by investing in Greenland. (Hammond, 2018).

4 Original quote: "Paternalistisk snak kan vi selvfølgelig ikke bruge til noget. Men udveksling af viden, udtænkning af løsninger og tilbud om samarbejde kan vi (...) derimod bruge rigtigt, rigtigt meget"
Greenlanders are opposed to what they perceive as Danish patronization and are very outspoken about the wish for independence. A major research project on Democracy and Power in Denmark was launched on the initiative of the Danish Parliament around the millennium. The study found that the Danish population does not care much about Greenlandic issues, and that more than 90% of the Danes agree that Greenlanders should be free to leave the Kingdom whenever they wish (Togeby, 2004). There is thus not much debate about whether they should hold the right to be independent. The debate is more about the terms. The Danish population perceives the Greenlandic population as ungrateful for the block grant, and if they are dissatisfied with the economic support then they should leave now or at least within a few years (Togeby, 2004).

It seems that the Greenlanders want to leave the Kingdom and the Danes do not mind if they do. So the question is; what is keeping the Kingdom together? According to Ulrik Pram Gad the two nations are dependent on each other. Greenland needs Denmark for two reasons. First it needs Denmark to recognize it as an equal. Only by being a nation equal to Denmark is it possible for the Greenlanders to take the final steps towards independence. The other reason they need Denmark is as a platform. Both as an economical platform to sustain a welfare state, and as an instrumental platform to develop the capacity to be self-sustainable (Gad, 2008).

Greenland is also very valuable to Denmark. Nils Wang calls Denmark an Arctic great power in the interview. He emphasizes that the only reason Denmark is an Arctic great power is because of Greenland (Wang, 2018). The current Danish government has the Arctic area as one of it’s top five prioritized foreign policy areas (Government of Denmark, 2017). In terms of security policy, Greenland’s importance to Denmark is huge. USA is, according to Wang, Denmark’s unambiguous guarantor for security and USA perceives Greenland as their eastern safeguard (Wang, 2015, Wang, 2018). Without Greenland, Denmark is not an Arctic state and would have no seat at the table of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is the main intergovernmental forum for the eight Arctic States; Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Sweden and the United States (Arctic-Council.org, 2018). The Arctic Council also includes six organizations representing the indigenous peoples in the Arctic area that are heard in the Council, and it includes non-Arctic states and organizations with observer status. The Arctic Council’s main task is to facilitate cooperation and coordination in the Arctic area. Here Denmark benefits from being one of eight countries and is sitting next to major Arctic players such as e.g. USA, Canada and Russia (Arctic-Council.org, 2018). Access to and membership of the Arctic Council serves as a platform on which Denmark can engage with great powers that would otherwise not be too sensitive to Denmark’s opinions. Additionally, as an Arctic coastal state, which means one of the Arctic states with a coastline in the Arctic Ocean, Denmark has been able to increase its relations with China since the Chinese are interested in what Denmark has to say in Arctic governance matters (Breum, 2013, Breum, 2014, Sørensen, 2018b). Greenland thus means that Denmark is an Arctic state, has direct access to other Great powers via the Arctic council and has its security guaranteed via USA’s interests in the island. In foreign and security policy terms, Greenland is very valuable to Denmark.

Denmark and Greenland are two nations and their people are equal in legal terms within the Kingdom of Denmark since the Self Government Act from 2009. However, it is still Denmark who formally represents Greenland at the Arctic Council, even though the Kingdom’s approach has changed to include much more input from both Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Burke, 2017). For example, to reflect the Kingdom’s internal dynamics and that it is not just Denmark who is represented at the Arctic Council, the forum’s web page says the Kingdom of Denmark, and Greenland is described under the Danish membership page (Arctic-Council.org, 2018). This description is given only for Denmark-Greenland-Faroe Islands, despite the fact that Sweden and Norway are also technically Kingdoms.

Greenlanders are aware of their foreign and security policy value for Denmark, and they have become more outspoken about their right to be acknowledged as a valuable partner for Denmark. In 2013, the then Greenlandic premier, Aleqa Hammond, boycotted a meeting in the Arctic Council in Kiruna,
Sweden, because she was dissatisfied that Greenland does not have its own seat at the table, but has to sit behind the Danish representative’s chair (Burke, 2017). This was a ministerial meeting where the United States Secretary of State John Kerry participated, and the diversion within the Kingdom of Denmark’s delegation was very embarrassing for Denmark. Denmark appeared as though it did not have control over its internal politics. Since this incident Greenland and the Faroe Islands have had their own places at the table in addition to the Danish representative’s (Breum, 2014).

Chapter Conclusion

Even though Denmark and Greenland have a long history, there is still a great reluctance from both countries when it comes to dealing with common issues and interests. This reluctance, or awkwardness, are in large part due to Greenland’s former status as a Danish colony. Denmark is reluctant to get involved with Greenlandic affairs, because Denmark fears the colonizer label. The colonizer label do not fit well with the Danish self-perception as an altruistic nation. Still Denmark sees great foreign political benefits in having Greenland as a part of the Kingdom and do not want Greenland to declare independence. Greenland on the other hand do want independence, but is still dependent on the block grant from Denmark and Denmark’s recognition and support on the institutional level. Neither nation can do without the other for the time being.
Chapter Four: Chinese Diplomacy in Greenland and the Arctic

The purpose of this chapter is to explore China’s interests in the Arctic. As this thesis sets out to investigate how the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland impacts the relationship between Denmark and Greenland, it is necessary to know both what the Chinese interest is and where it comes from. In 2013, China officially stated that it is on a path to great power diplomacy and this includes the Arctic region (Chen, 2016). The Chinese perception of great power diplomacy is strongly associated with Josephs Nye’s soft power concept, but it also holds elements of coercion. The attraction-coercion nexus and the principle of sovereignty are the corner stones of Chinese diplomacy (Chen, 2016). These two corner stones will be visible throughout the below investigation of the Chinese interest in the Arctic and in Greenland in particular. This is followed by a brief discussion on the newly published Chinese white paper on its Arctic interests as well as a discussion of how China relates to the Kingdom of Denmark as a whole.

The Development of the Chinese Arctic Interest

The Chinese interest in the Arctic first materialized with a Chinese icebreaker purchase in 1994. The icebreaker is called Xuelong which means snow dragon, and China has since then conducted research in the polar region (Jakobsen, 2010). The interest in the Arctic region gradually increased during the 2010’s. Already back in 2012, China referred to itself as a near-Arctic state and an Arctic stakeholder. China was outspoken about its perceived right to influence Arctic governance. The argument was that the Arctic has a global ramification and that China should have a say in it (Jakobsen and Peng, 2012). This was followed by a speech by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2014 where he said that the Arctic has strong strategic importance for China as a polar great power (Brady, 2017:38). It all culminated in late January 2018 when China issued its first white paper on its Arctic policy (Peoples Republic of China, 2018).

There are many reasons why the Arctic came to arrive at the Chinese agenda. Jakobsen and Peng (2012), for example, argue how vital interests such as food
security are influenced by the melting ice from the Arctic. The cold waters are causing extreme weather, storms, floods and abnormal temperatures and in the end influencing agriculture and food security in the country (Jakobsen and Peng, 2012, Brady, 2017). It is thus with a valid rationale that China started to develop an interest in the Arctic. In the beginning, this interest was mostly concerned with matters like the environment and climate change, but the Chinese interest changed over the years to a broader focus that also includes shipping, mining, science, governance in the region and not least military interests (Jakobsen and Peng, 2012, Brady, 2017).

The Chinese Arctic activities are today directly linked to the context of China’s overall foreign policy goals. Officially these are; 1. Political stability, 2. Sovereign security, territorial integrity and national unification, and 3. Sustainable and economic development (Jakobsen and Peng, 2012). Jakobsen and Peng argue that the Arctic politics can be seen in the light of the 3rd goal – economic development. I would also argue that it can be seen in the light of the first and second goals as well. China seeks to take part in the decisive actions in the Arctic via the Arctic Council and by upholding international law (Arctic-Council.org, 2018, Peoples Republic of China, 2018). In the end, these actions reflect both political stability (ensuring a growing market and commercial interests) and upholding China’s much valued sovereignty principle.

**Chinese Arctic Diplomacy**

Zhimin Chen argues that there are two corner stones of Chinese global diplomacy. One is the principle of sovereignty and the other is the use of soft power (Chen, 2016). The principle of sovereignty has been a corner stone since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 (Chen, 2016). This is why China generally prefers bilateral partnerships over multinational institutions. By entering into bilateral partnerships, China is able to develop cooperation without jeopardizing its sovereignty (Chen, 2016).

The other corner stone, soft power, was quick to enter into official Chinese language after its conceptualization (Nye, 2012, Chen, 2016). Soft power is a
term originally coined by Joseph S. Nye in the late 1980's (Nye, 2004). Nye defines soft power as

“The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced” (Nye, 2004:X).

Soft power, according to Nye, is the ability to establish others’ preferences through attraction and moral authority.

Chen (2016) holds that China was greatly inspired by the concept of soft power, but created their own version of it. He defines the special Chinese soft power as

“Soft power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather has to be nurtured through a soft use of power. Soft power does not just come from attraction of non-material resources, like culture, political values and appealing foreign policy, but also from the attraction of material interests, profitable market or provision of foreign aid” (Chen, 2016:356).

China thus uses its attractive markets and exports as a part of its soft power policy to gain influence. It holds an immense untapped domestic market as well as a big low-cost labour force (Chen, 2016).

Alongside an attractive market China has opened Confucius Institutes around the world to teach and spread Chinese language and culture (Nye, 2012, Chen, 2016). A relevant example of this, is that the city of Shanghai and the Greenlandic city Qaqortoq recently agreed on a collaboration where “Shanghai” will teach Chinese language and culture in the schools of Qaqortoq (Hannestad, 2016).

China is careful not to cause any alarm in the Arctic due to its status as a rising global power and its size (Jakobsen, 2010, Sørensen, 2018c). As a rising global power, China thus softens its use of power in order not to seem too aggressive and be faced with closed doors. Nye points to the fact that when a country increases its hard power as much as China has done in recent decades, it is strategically smart also to increase its soft power, so that its neighbours are less likely to be frightened into a coalition against it. Chinas thus employs what Nye calls smart power; neither hard nor soft – but both (Nye, 2004).
The First Chinese White Paper on Arctic Policy

China officially issued an Arctic policy for the first time in January 2018. They did so with a white paper called *China’s Arctic Policy*. The paper makes clear that China officially considers the Arctic as a region that now “goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or Arctic nature, having vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region ...” (Peoples Republic of China, 2018). The white paper states directly that China considers the Arctic as having global significance and that it considers itself to be an active participant.

Camilla T. N Sørensen, for example, explores the recent shift in China’s approach towards global power politics. Sørensen shows in her recent policy brief on the Chinese white paper that China in recent years has been changing its foreign policy from keeping a low profile to a more progressive and active policy of engagement in the global arena (Sørensen, 2018c). This includes the Arctic region as well and correlates with Chen’s (2016) account of current day great power diplomacy of China.

Along with arguing that the Arctic matters, China talks about respecting international law, promoting science cooperation, sustainability, protecting the environment as well as commercial interests. The white paper ensures the readers multiple times that China respects the sovereignty and international law in the area, but also considers the governance of the Arctic and the High North as the responsibility of the international community as a whole and not just of the Arctic territorial states. China declares itself a near-Arctic state, an important stakeholder in the Arctic affairs and declares the area important in regards to the economic development of China. It also directly links the opening of sea routes to its BRI strategy. (Peoples Republic of China, 2018)

China’s Arctic policy white paper has caused quite a stir in public and academic discourse, in large part because China is finally formalizing the positions that it has on regional issues and interests which have long been suspected, but that it has been reluctant to articulate until recently. The white paper confirms well known policies though there is an omission of any discussion of what the Arctic means to China’s national security (Lulu, 2018).
China’s fellow non-arctic players, South Korea and Japan, have had their Arctic policy papers published in 2013 and 2015. The ‘missing’ Chinese white paper created mistrust in the outside world. Foley argues, that Beijing needs the white paper to reassure international concerns about the nature of the Chinese interest in the region (Foley, 2017).

**The Wide Span of the Chinese Interest in the Region**

As China highlights in the white paper, their interest in the Arctic covers a wide span of issues. The catalogue of Arctic interests includes military perspectives, shipping, commercial interests and scientific research. These issues will here be briefly discussed in turn.

The Arctic is one of the lesser militarized regions on the globe. Still, it does have some strategic value to the great powers, including China (Brady, 2017). Open-source Chinese academia started to address the military value of an Arctic sea route. Jakobsen calls it rare that Chinese open-source articles are so outspoken regarding the military value of the Arctic (Jakobsen, 2010). She quotes researcher Guo Peiqing of saying that it is not in China’s interest to remain neutral and “stay clear of Arctic affairs”. Peiqing argues that as a transforming power (from regional to global), China need to be active in the Arctic in order not to miss out on decisive power in the region (Jakobsen, 2010:7). In the interview with rear admiral Nils Wang it was stressed that there is no present military threat from China in the Arctic regions, and that the region is not thought to be militarized by China or others in the short to medium term (Wang, 2018).

In terms of Chinese shipping and commercial interests these are much more present in the region. China is reliant on foreign trade, and nearly half of its GDP is thought to be dependent on shipping (Jakobsen, 2010, Breum, 2013). It can save 6,500 km if it succeeds in sailing on the Northern sea route. At the same time it will save the costly insurances that come with sailing through the strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal (Jakobsen, 2010). A central part of China’s approach towards the Arctic has been its focus on polar shipping; a fact it has emphasized in its 2018 Arctic policy document. Authors such as Breum (2013), Sørensen
(2018c), and Foley (2017), have noted China's shipping ambitions, reflecting that factors such as shorter routes and lower costs have been driving China's continued commitment to polar shipping investment. New Arctic trade routes also open the possibility for Chinese shipping to avoid conflict prone areas such as the Malacca strait.

Sørensen (2018c), for example, shows how the northern sea route has become a part of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by Xi Jinping in 2013. The main goal of the BRI is to ensure better and faster transportation and communication between China and Europe. In November 2014 the world saw the first indications that this new ambitious foreign policy strategy included the Arctic. President Jinping mentioned China as a great polar power for the first time and made a connection between the Arctic, Antarctic and the goal of China as a polar great power (Sørensen, 2018c:38, Brady, 2017). The Arctic is, according to Sørensen, on top of the present day Chinese foreign and security policy agenda.

Along with clear commercial interests there are the possibilities of promising natural resources such as minerals, oil and gas. China has shown a persistent interest in investing in the natural resources in Greenland (Breum, 2014).

**China and its Relations with the Kingdom of Denmark**

China approaches the Arctic region very delicately so as to not create too much concern about their progressive involvement and interest in the region. China is careful not to step on any toes in relation to the complex Greenland/Denmark relationship. China for example still seeks approval from Copenhagen when it comes to activities and projects in Greenland (Sørensen, 2018c). While China is careful in its handling of the Danish-Greenlandic relations, Sørensen (2018b) gives some examples that indicate that China is starting to develop direct diplomatic relations with the Greenlandic self-rule. One example of the growing Sino-Greenlandic relations is the Memorandum of Understanding from May 2016 between the Chinese State Oceanic Administration, a department under the Ministry for Land and Resources, and the Greenlandic Department for Education, Culture, Research and Church.
Another example that illustrates the bilateral relations is when Suka K. Frederiksen, the Greenlandic Minister for Independence, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture visited the new Chinese ambassador to Denmark in the beginning of January 2018. Even though the following press statement called it ‘local exchanges’ they also discussed ‘Arctic affairs’, so it was maybe not that local after all (Sørensen, 2018c). In an interview conducted with Camilla T. N. Sørensen, she explains how it is important to China to keep good relations to both governments. They want to be sure that they are not on any governments bad side, and this is a way of preparing for future scenarios (Sørensen, 2018a). In the policy brief Sørensen shows how China finds it confusing to figure out who to contact for future Arctic relations inside the Danish realm – Copenhagen or Nuuk. Further, she argues, it is of absolute necessity for the reliability of the Danish realm in the broad sense to find a stronger and common agreement between Denmark and Greenland when it comes to dealing with the increased Chinese interest. Neither nation can deal with China alone (Sørensen, 2018c).

China is interested in the Arctic for commercial as well as political reasons. China’s interest in Greenland is specifically resting on multiple factors. China does not hold enough satellite ground stations in the Arctic as required for climate change research purposes and Greenland offers a location for this ground satellite station. Two specific spots have been hinted. One near Kangaamiut or Maniitsoq in southwest Greenland and another near the Citronen Fjord in northernmost Greenland (Martin, 2018). Another aspect that makes Greenland attractive is its rare earth elements; a market in which China almost holds a monopoly at the moment in the world rare earth minerals economy, but Greenland has an estimated 25% of the world’s deposits (Breum, 2013).

China is careful always to mention Denmark, when in fact its Arctic interests are related to Greenland. Greenland is not mentioned by name in the Arctic white paper. Denmark is (Lulu, 2018). The official China avoids being perceived as supporting independence in any way, as they strongly uphold the principle of sovereignty (Chen, 2016).
**Chapter conclusion**

As this chapter has shown there is great consensus among scholars, that China is very interested in Arctic matters and holds every intention to play an active role in multiple areas. At the same time, its strategy of using soft power in the form of cooperation, bilateral agreements and commercial attractiveness creates suspicion among the other Arctic stakeholders. As a reaction to this, China changed its strategy from being very cautious to being more proactive in Arctic matters as well as finally publishing a white paper on the subject. China is keen on being on good terms with both Greenland and Denmark while still observant not to be perceived as a supporter of Greenlandic independence.
Chapter Five – Official Government Perspectives

The following chapter constitutes the first part of the analysis. It studies the official Danish and Greenlandic government perceptions of Chinese investments in Greenland. The aim of the this chapter is to highlight the diverging perceptions on whether the Chinese investments should be considered a security issue or not. The first section look into the Danish perspective and shows how Denmark is cautiously balancing its security rhetoric. The second section shows how the security rhetoric is fully absent from the Greenlandic governments perspective. The official government perceptions of this issue matters, because the dissonance between the perceptions is where the impact from the Chinese interest in Greenland lies. It is thus here, a great part of the answer to the thesis’ research question found.

The Official Danish Perspective: Chinese Investments as a Security Issue

This section explores the official Danish perspective on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland.

The analysis will look into two different sources. The first source is a report issued in June 2016 by the Danish Ministry of Defence published called “The future missions of the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Arctic” (FMMDA). The report is a thorough analysis which was written up by representatives from Greenland, the Faroe Islands, multiple ministries, official agencies and research institutes. Its recommendations and conclusions formed the basis of a new revised Arctic Defence Policy (MoD, 2016a). In this analysis, the FMMDA report functions as an expression of the Danish government’s official take on China’s interest in investing in Greenland.

The second source is the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) public risk assessments from 2010-2017. DDIS is subject to the Minister of Defence and as such also a part of the official Danish perspective on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland (DDIS, 2018). Where the FMMDA report is an expression of the government’s take on the current challenges in the Arctic and
is a political document, the risk assessments are expressions of the intelligence services’ take on the current challenges affecting Danish security and are more politically independent than the report.

**The Future Missions of MoD in the Arctic**

At first sight, the “The future missions of the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Arctic” report indicates that China is not a big concern for the Danish Ministry of Defence’ missions in the Arctic. The report is 249 pages long and a word search only gives three hits on the word *Kina* (China) and only one time it says *Kinesisk* (Chinese). The report more generally mentions that there is “an increased political challenge, but no direct military threat.” (MoD, 2016c:52 My translation)^5. It could seem though, as if China is of no security policy concern from a Danish perspective. When the report is read more thoroughly, however, a different reality shows.

In the report section, “Security Policy Framework”, the FMDDA report states that the general security policy framework of the report is built partly on the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s (DDIS) yearly risk assessment reports (which are analysed later on) and partly build on an independent security policy report that is included in the report as its second appendix. Looking into the second appendix of the report, the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland is much more present as a security threat. The appendix, with its 55 pages, is much more direct with regard to highlighting the risks of the Chinese investments than the report itself. When the word search from the FMMDA report is repeated in the appendix, it unveils that *Kina* (China) is mentioned 47 times and *Kinesisk* (Chinese) 25 times.

The Chinese interest in Greenland also has its own subsection of the appendix. Here it is foreseen, that the Chinese economic engagement in Greenland will increase in the future, and that

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^5 Original quote: "den øgede politiske udfordring men ikke nogen direkte militær trussel"
“China's commercial and strategic interests, however, are traditionally closely intertwined, and the Chinese leadership does not see commodity policy, trade policy, foreign policy and security policy as separate areas. It is therefore likely that China's role and potential influence in the Arctic regions will increase as China's economic commitment in the regions grows”6 (MoD, 2016b:54 My translation).

By referring to the perception that China does not distinguish between trade and security policy, the Chinese investments and interest in Greenland is somewhat securitized, because the Chinese economic activities are being linked to a security rhetoric.

The appendix further illustrates the Danish securitization move on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. It does so with a reference to increased economic activity rather than naming China itself:

“"To the extent that there is increased economic activity in the Arctic regions, this will to some extent constitute a risk for the environment, population and wildlife. These conditions will all lead to increased demands on the ability of the Ministry of Defence to contribute to increased surveillance, a broader security for the community and an increased emergency preparedness”7(MoD, 2016b:55 My translation).

What exactly is meant by “broader security for the community” and what kinds of risks the populations face with an increased economic activity in the region is not explained in the document.

The appendix states multiple times that China is increasing its economic activities and interests in the region. Though the appendix does not say directly that Chinese economic activities alone constitute a risk for the population and the community, there are strong indications of that being the case. With the mentioning of “increased political challenge” and the strong connection between

6 Original quote: "Kinas kommercielle og strategiske interesser er dog traditionelt tæt sammenvævede, og den kinesiske ledelse ser ikke råstofpolitik, handelspolitik, udenrigspolitik og sikkerheds-politik som adskilte områder. Det er derfor sandsynligt, at Kinas rolle og mulige indflydelse på det arktiske område vil stige, i takt med at Kinas økonomiske engagement i regionen vokser.”

7 Original quote: "I det omfang at der kommer øget økonomisk aktivitet i Arktis, vil det i nogen grad betyde risici for miljø, befolkning og dyreliv. Disse forhold vil alle føre til øgede krav til Forsvarsministeriets evne til at bidrage til en øget overvågning, bredere samfundssikkerhed og et øget beredskab.”
Chinese trade and security policies, the report and its appendix paints a clear picture of Chinese investments as a possible security issue.

The mentioning of an “increased political challenge” in the FMMDA report is further explained in the appendix as well. Here it says

“[the risks for the security policy] illustrate how, under certain circumstances, coastal states may risk having to deal with the implications of increased political tension in the region for the security policy. Ultimately, the security of the Kingdom of Denmark is guaranteed through its NATO membership. [...] The Kingdom of Denmark has a responsibility that needs to be administered. This applies both to the sustainability of the region and to the many different players who act in the region, especially in or near the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark”

8 (MoD, 2016b:55 My translation).

By linking political tension in the Arctic to Denmark’s NATO membership and increased economic activity in or near the territory of the Kingdom there is, again, an implicit reference to China’s interest in the Arctic and in particular Greenland.

What these documents lack to constitute a full securitization move is a sense of urgency. Both the FMMDA report itself, as well as the appendix, are pointing to future and possible scenarios. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde list as conditions for a securitization move that the securitizing actor should place an argument of priority and urgency of an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998:25). In this case, China is an existential threat to the “broader community” of the Kingdom. The arguments found in the report do claim priority to the issue, but urgency is nowhere to be found. This takes the sting out of the securitization move. In all the quotes analyzed above, the word “security” is mentioned directly. The authors argue that “By saying security a state representative declares an emergency condition” (Buzan et al., 1998:21). The

8 Original quote: “De [sikkerhedspolitiske risici] illustrerer imidlertid, hvordan kyststaterne under bestemte omstændigheder kan risikere at skulle håndtere de sikkerhedspolitiske konsekvenser af øget politisk spænding i regionen. I sidste ende er Kongeriget Danmarks sikkerhed garanteret gennem NATO-medlemskabet. [...] Kongeriget Danmark har et ansvar, der skal forvaltes. Det gælder både i forhold til regionens bæredygtighed og over for de mange forskellige aktører, der færdes i regionen, særligt i eller nær Kongeriget Danmarks territorium.”
appendix of the FDDMA report is thus an expression of Denmark making a securitization move towards the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. For it to be a full securitization, the argument also has to have salience among the audience, e.g. the Danish population (Buzan et al., 1998).

The FMMDA report is a government document, and hence a political document, and does not in itself problematize the Chinese economic interest in Greenland. The Government of Denmark cannot make a full securitization move on the Chinese investments in Greenland, as Denmark has an interest in maintaining good relations with both Greenland and China. Rather, it refers to China in the appendix in order to downplay the securitizing move. It is noticeable how, even in the appendix, it does not state directly that it is the Chinese economic activity that constitutes a risk for the community or the population. The FDDMA report should be read in the light of what it is – a political document.

As discussed in the methodology chapter, political documents are often biased and thus lack some credibility. Instead, they should be read in the light of this bias and not as depictions of reality (Bryman, 2012). When the FDDMA report downplays the Chinese security issue, it is not necessarily because the government does not see a security issue in the Chinese interest in Greenland. It could also be because it is intent on keeping up good relations with both China and Greenland.

The DDIS Risk Assessments

The FMMDA report lists the risk assessments form the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) as background for the “security policy framework” alongside its appendix. Here the DDIS assessments are subject to a summative content analysis, where the frequency of certain words is counted as well as the length of certain sections of the assessments. This summarizing of some quantitative measures of the assessments is done in order to guide the interpretation of the use of the certain words and sections.

On the website of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service it is explained that: “The intelligence risk assessment provides a current assessment of
conditions abroad affecting Denmark’s security” (DDIS, 2018). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue, that in a democracy it is generally accepted that there exist what the authors call ‘black security boxes’ where issues are taken out of the public discourse. This is accepted by the public because there is an already established securitization around the topic legitimizing why the public is not given details on the issue. Entire fields of security issues can be moved to a form of treatment that is legitimized in democracies exactly because they have been defined as security (Buzan et al., 1998:28).

This moving of security issues away from the public agenda is carried out by the intelligence services. In this section and for this reason, it is the public risk assessments that are analysed, as the qualified risk assessments and their issues are never discussed in or available to the public. The public risk assessments dealt with here portray issues that are labelled security issues as they are dealt with by DDIS, an actor that per definition holds the ability to securitize. The DDIS notes that the public risk assessment has: “been prepared on the basis of classified reports; however, it has been prepared with all-inclusive accessibility in mind. This has impacted on the wording in the assessment and on the number of details included” (DDIS, 2018).

The DDIS risk assessments are issued yearly and are available to the public from 2010 to 2017. Through the eight available reports the length of the risk assessments the “Arctic section” is increasing as shown by Graph 1 below. For each of the eight reports the Arctic sections were quantified in terms of number of characters used. This data was made into the below graph showing the year of the DDIS assessment on the X-axis and the number of characters of the Arctic sections on the Y-axis. Graph 1 illustrates the growing profile of the Arctic as a security issue indicated by increasing references to it in the risk assessments.
Graph 1: Number of characters in the “Arctic sections” of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s yearly public risk assessments from 2010-2017.

Graph 1 illustrates how the length of the Arctic sections of the DDIS risk assessments measured in number of characters increases in overall measures in the time period from 2010 till 2017. In 2010 the section only took up less than 3,000 characters. In 2017 the Arctic section more than triples in space with almost 11,000 characters used to describe the security situation in the Arctic. The peak in 2014 and the subsequent dip in 2015 are not accounted for in the text. The themes mentioned in the Arctic sections are the same for both years, even though they take up more space in 2014 than in 2015. In 2014 Denmark passed legislation that allowed the Greenlandic Large Scale Act to come into force. The Large Scale Act allowed foreign workers on large scale projects in Greenland and the passing created a heated debate within the Kingdom. This could be the reason for the lengthy Arctic section in 2014 (Foley, 2017). The overall tendency of an increased length of the Arctic section is an expression of the DDIS increasing its focus on the issues in the area. As DDIS per definition is a securitizing actor, its increasing focus on the Arctic also means an increasing securitizing tendency of the Arctic by the Danish state.
From an overall perspective the Arctic sections are concerned with mainly two issues: Russia and China. While Russia is not dealt with here, it is noticeable how the report’s focus on China and Greenland is increasing. This is illustrated in Graph 2 below. Graph 2 shows the count of the words “China” or “Chinese” and “Greenland” in the Arctic section of the DDIS risk assessments. Accounting for the use of these words and interpreting them in their context add to the understanding of the official Danish perspective of the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. The increasing use of the words is a part of the context of the impact that the Chinese interest has in the bilateral relationship between Greenland and Denmark. On the X-axis is once again listed the year the assessment was published. On the Y-axis the word count is illustrated.

Graph 2: The number of times the words “China” or “Chinese” and “Greenland” appear in the “Arctic section” of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s yearly public risk assessments from 2010-2017.

Graph 2 illustrates the use of the words China/Chinese and Greenland in the Arctic Sections of the DDIS reports from 2010-2017. In 2010 neither Greenland nor China are mentioned once. It is, however, mentioned that (unspecified) superpowers have an increasing interest in the Arctic area (DDIS, 2010). In the following reports both China and Greenland are specifically
mentioned with an increasing tendency. In the newest report from 2017 China/Chinese are mentioned 33 times and Greenland 9 times. The peak in 2014 of the use of the terms “China/Chinese” corresponds to the section being longer than in 2015. The reasons for the peak of the use of the term “Greenland” in 2016 is not clear from the assessments itself when compared to the other years. It may be noticed that 2016 also is the year when the Prime Minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, behind the scenes withdrew the sale of the naval base, Grønnedal. This case is analysed in chapter six.

As Graph 2 shows, the assessments start mentioning China in connection with the Arctic from 2011 and onwards. An overall reading of the eight risk assessments reveals two trends in connection with the mentioning of China. One is concerned with the Arctic as a whole and the opening of new and shorter shipping routes available to China. The other main trend is how China is interested in investing in Greenland’s minerals such as zinc, uranium and rare earth minerals (REE). It is critical for China to secure a supply of these minerals in the long term (e.g. DDIS, 2013:14-15, DDIS, 2015:34). The Chinese interest in Greenland’s minerals is the second empirical case analysed in chapter six. Regarding the minerals, it is mentioned how the increasing Chinese interest in investing in Greenland may lead to political pressure on a relatively small community. This is where the securitization move is shown in its most clear form.

One example of this is from the 2015 risk assessment where it says:

“Due to close ties between Chinese raw materials companies and the Chinese political system, major investments in Greenland face a certain level of risks as large-scale investments impact significantly on small economies such as the one in Greenland. Therefore, investments in strategic resources are potentially prone to political interference and pressure” (DDIS, 2015:34).

The “risk of increased political tension” in the Arctic that is mentioned in the FMMDA report and its appendix is framed in a much clearer manner with regard to the increased Chinese interest in investing in Greenland in the risk assessments.
Throughout all the risk assessments the increased Chinese interest in Greenland is framed as a security issue. Like in the appendix of the FMMDA report this is not a full securitization move. The framing as an interim situation, and that the risk is seen as a possible future scenario has the effect that this too lacks the sense of urgency required for a full securitization move. This is visible in the above quotes with the use of phrases like “a certain level of risk” and words such as “likely” and “potentially”. A full securitization move would entail that the security risk was urgent, and that the only way to deal with it would be to handle it outside the normal frame of politics. (Buzan et al., 1998) Also, the edge is taken off the securitization move, because the appendix as well as the risk assessments mention that the Arctic is not high up on the Chinese foreign policy agenda and that the Chinese interest at the moment does not appear to be part of any state controlled plan or in any other way stretches beyond commercial interests (See e.g. DDIS, 2013, DDIS, 2014, DDIS, 2015, MoD, 2016b, DDIS, 2011).

What is noticeable in the risk assessments that are framing China’s interest in investing in Greenland is that the wording indicates that the purely commercial interest is only temporary. In the 2013 risk assessment it says

“Traditionally, the commercial and strategic interests of China are, however, intrinsically linked. Therefore, it is likely that China’s role and potential influence in the Arctic region will increase as China’s economic involvement grows. On a number of occasions, China has demonstrated both capability and willingness to use investments and other kinds of economic instruments as a lever to obtain political objectives” (DDIS, 2013:15).

The quote shows that it is feared that the Chinese economic activity on Greenland will lead to the Arctic being higher on the Chinese foreign and security policy agenda eventually.

A full securitization move consists of two things; an existential threat to a referent object as well as a sense of urgency, where urgency points in the direction of specific emergency measures and a violation of normal politics and established rules. There is no emergency to be found in the DDIS risk assessments, but there are notions of a possible existential threat to the
Greenlandic community, as it is emphasized how in time China will try and push for political influence in the small and vulnerable Inuit community.

**Concluding remarks on the official Danish perspective**

As the above analysis of the FMMDA reports, at a first glance China does not seem to be seen as a major security policy concern to the Danish government. After a more thorough reading of the appendixes and the analysis of the DDIS risk assessments upon which the report is built, China’s involvement in Greenland is of growing concern. The analysis illustrates that the Chinese interest in the Greenlandic minerals is on the Kingdom’s security agenda as indicated by their inclusion in the public Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s risk assessments. The overall Chinese interest in Greenland’s natural resources is a security concern but has not developed into a fully securitized issue yet.
The official Greenlandic Perspective: China as the Key to Independence

The official Greenlandic perception of the Chinese interest in investments is analyzed in this section. The analysis will primarily be based on two official government reports called “Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018” and “How can growth and welfare in Greenland be secured?” from 2010. Along with the two reports, other sources, which are used in this analysis, are news and statements from the official Greenlandic government’s website. As the news and statements are found on the government’s website, they are read as expressions of the official Greenlandic perspective on Chinese investments. While the policy documents do not directly deal with the Greenlandic take on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland specifically, only with investments more generally, their status is authoritative in the sense that they exceed the performativity of other types of speech acts, as policy is being carried out via these government reports (Rasmussen and Merkelsen, 2017). The news and statements do not hold the same authority as policy documents, but often have more direct statements on specific issues e.g. the specific Chinese interest in investing and not just foreign investments in general.

First, this section performs a content analysis of the reports “Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018” and “How can growth and welfare in Greenland be secured?” This part of the analysis is aimed at exploring the motivations behind Greenland’s search for foreign investments and its long time goals and objectives. The second part of the analysis is a discourse analysis on the statements from the official web side. Last, the findings from two parts of the analysis are discussed with knowledge drawn from the background chapters on the Greenlandic self-perception and goals.

Greenland’s Perspective as Reflected in Government Reports

The report “How can growth and welfare in Greenland be secured?” is a product of the Tax and Welfare Commission in 2010. The Tax and Welfare Commission was formed in 2009 with the aim of investigating how the welfare in Greenland could be improved (Naalakkersuisut, 2010). The 102 page report is a
discussion on how Greenland can develop its welfare despite a small and aging population. A section called “Kilder til vækst” [Sources of growth] highlights how the future welfare in Greenland is dependent on foreign investments (Naalakkersuisut, 2010).

The report does not mention China directly and it does also not go into details about if some foreign investments are to be preferred over others or if there is any kind of risk for the Greenlandic society in relying on a foreign workforce. The report simply states that “Growth opportunities in Greenland are primarily linked to the major potential business projects based on natural resources.” (Naalakkersuisut, 2010:22). And further down the same page: “A particular challenge in a Greenlandic context is, that the projects are big relative to the nation’s population. There is thus a need for capital and expertise from abroad” (Naalakkersuisut, 2010:22).

In the report, it is highlighted that approximately 50% of the funding for securing the Greenlandic welfare and public finances comes from the block grant from Denmark (Naalakkersuisut, 2010:17). For the time being, the economic growth of Greenland is dependent on investments and skilled labor from abroad, with Greenland presently unable to sustain or enhance its welfare without foreign investments (Naalakkersuisut, 2010, Breum, 2014). Economic dependence is at the heart of Greenland’s security issues, and it is directly linked to its independence ambitions. Rasmussen and Merkelsen show how the deep narrative in Greenland presents economic independence as the road to independence, a road that is often complicated by colonial tendencies from Denmark (Rasmussen and Merkelsen, 2017). The report “How can growth and welfare in Greenland be secured?” does not mention Denmark directly as an obstacle to independence, but when the report is read more thoroughly, it becomes clear that Greenland needs to free itself from the dependency of the block grant. The report fits perfectly into the security narrative of economic

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9 Original quote: “Vækstmulighederne i Grønland er primært knyttet til de store potentielle erhvervsprojekter baseret på naturressourcerne.”

10 Original quote: “En særlig udfordring i en grønlandsk sammenhæng er, at projekterne er store i forhold til landets befolkning. Der er derfor et behov for kapital og ekspertise udefra.”
dependency of Denmark as a hindrance of the overall goal of Greenland as an independent nation.

The second report is called “Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018” is, like the Tax and Welfare Commission report, not directly about Chinese investments. Rather “Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018” is about how Greenland can use its oil and mineral resources with the aim of promoting prosperity and welfare in Greenland by creating income and employment opportunities (Naalakkersuisut, 2014:7). The report does here and there mention China specifically. It notes that “the marketing efforts include activities aimed directly at carefully selected countries” (Naalakkersuisut, 2014:43) and then gives examples of mining and industry events that the Greenlandic government have attended in China since 2011. While China is not the only country that Greenland turn to in search of foreign investments, it is one of the “carefully selected countries” mentioned in the quote above.

As the below quote from the Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018 report highlights, China has been singled out as a political priority by Greenland and has been the subject of an active investment campaign on governmental level in Greenland. The visits to China are called an “important leverage” in the report, that further states;

“The visits have contributed to creating new opportunities for co-operation with ministries as well as underlying institutions such as geological research institutions. These opportunities for co-operation would be difficult to bring about administratively with political participation. The official visits are also used to forge contacts with investment banks and potential major purchasers of the mineral resources in Greenland’s subsoil.” (Naalakkersuisut, 2014:44)

Though China, and foreign investments in general, are highlighted as the future avenues for Greenlandic prosperity, some problems are mentioned.

One of these problems is that foreign workers will pressure the existing health care system. These workers are thought to be from Asia (Naalakkersuisut, 2014:13). While noting the origin of the workers as Asian is not the same as saying the workers will come from China, there is a latent indication of it seen in
the light of the rest of the report and the above quotes. Another problem mentioned is that the mining project will create an estimated 3,400 jobs annually, and the Greenlandic labour force will not be able to fully meet the requirements of these jobs. The report concludes that “Foreign labour will thus be needed which can play a part in creating the basis for a mining industry with jobs of a long-term character” (Naalakkersuisut, 2014:82). The notion of the Asian workers in the healthcare system, the need for foreign labour and the report’s emphasis on China as one of the “carefully selected countries” from which to seek investments all fit well with the overall narrative of China as the solution to the overall goal: Economic independence and hence national independence.

The two reports highlight the problems that the Greenlandic society faces in terms of securing the level of desired welfare without the block grant from Denmark. The solution in both reports seems to clearly come from the mining industry (and other natural resources). As Greenland does not have the financial or infrastructural capacity to make use of these natural resources on its own, the solution in the end may come from foreign investment (Naalakkersuisut, 2010, Naalakkersuisut, 2014).

The second report analyzed here suggests that this foreign investment could be Chinese (Naalakkersuisut, 2014). There are no signs of securitization with regard to foreign investments and China is not highlighted for anything else than holding the capacity in terms of know-how and capital that Greenland lacks. The “Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018” report makes it clear that the problems that are foreseen can be solved with new legislation or reforms (e.g. Naalakkersuisut, 2014:34). There is no sense of either urgency or problem solving outside the existing political norms. These two conditions need to be met for issues to be moved from the political agenda to the securitizing agenda (Buzan et al., 1998). Thus the problems connected with foreign investment and labour are not securitized.
Greenland’s Perspective as Reflected on the Government Website

On the official Greenlandic Government website news have been issued that treat the Chinese investments and interest in Greenland directly. It is a more informal source of information than the often long and expert written reports. It is thus an obvious place to find statements from the government that are much more direct about the issue than those expressed in reports. Some of the news revolve around a week long trade promotion carried out in the Fall 2017 in China. Here the Premier of Greenland, Kim Kielsen, and three of his Ministers met with the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Chao, and according to the entry they talked about infrastructure, business and mineral exploitation among other things. On the official webpage the meeting was called a “huge success” and the four members of the government, the Danish Ambassador to China and the Chinese Vice minister of foreign affairs all smile at the camera (Naalakkersuisut.gl, 2017b).

![Image of meeting]

It is noticeable that China receives the Greenlandic government delegation with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. China sends the signal that Greenland is an important trade and investment partner, when a government official of this high rank makes time in his schedule to meet with the Greenlandic delegation. During the visit Greenland also celebrated and promoted itself via a “Greenland Day”. Here, again, all four ministers took part to promote Greenlandic export and investment projects as well as Greenlandic culture. It also celebrated
that Greenland and China have had business exchanges for 21 years (Naalakkersuisut.gl, 2017a).

Not long after New Year’s in 2018, the Greenlandic Minister of Independence, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, Suka K. Frederiksen, paid a visit to the Chinese Embassy in Copenhagen. Here the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark expressed his great interest in Greenland and the cooperation that had developed between Greenland and China. The ambassador thanked the Greenlandic Government for visiting China in the fall and described the visit as very satisfying. The Minister and the Ambassador agreed to develop the Chinese-Greenlandic relationship further (Naalakkersuisut.gl, 2018).

**Concluding Remarks on the Greenlandic Perspective**

Greenland’s then deputy foreign minister Kai Holst Andersen said it clearly: “We particularly welcome investments from China because we can see that you can do a lot of what we need” (Chinaeconomicreview.com, 2014). The above analysis of the news presented on the official government web site shows how promoting Greenland in China is not only undertaken on a very high political level but is also received in China on a high political level. The success of the promotional efforts is highlighted in the news on the Government of Greenland’s website and here no security concerns are to be found. Rather, only talk of furthering the cooperation between the two nations.

By taking a closer look at the two policy reports and the news issued by the government itself as an expression of the official Greenlandic take on the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland, it can be concluded that there is no sign of securitizing the Chinese interest in Greenland. Rather it is sought enhanced and framed as the bringer of the future welfare of the Greenlandic society. In the reports analyzed a few potential problems are mentioned, but always framed in a light where they can be handled through normal legislation, e.g. the problems of health care capacity or fears of a skewness in the labor market.
Chapter Six - Empirical Cases

The two cases studied in this chapter illustrate that there are two different perceptions of China’s interest in investing in Greenland within the Danish Kingdom which diverge regarding the degree to which they perceive China’s interest as a security issue. As it was shown in the analysis on the official government perception of the issue, Denmark and Greenland have quite different takes on the Chinese investments. There are many cases where the governments of the two nations have had to balance their competing perceptions of China during key decision-making processes which involved both nations. The two that are examined here are first the case of Grønnedal, a military base that was withdrawn from the market, after China made a bid to buy it. The second case is the broader issue of mineral extraction in Greenland which is seen as part of the path to independence for the Greenlanders and in which China has expressed an interest in being involved.

**Grønnedal – a Military Symbol**

Grønnedal was put up for sale and then withdrawn from the market again after a Chinese company made a bid. The case will be analysed via a simple discourse analysis as proposed by Wæver (2002) with a focus on speech acts. Grønnedal was the headquarters of the Joint Arctic Command until September 2014 where the activities were moved to Nuuk. Since then, the naval base was deserted for more than two years and put up for sale. In the late 2016, Grønnedal was surprisingly reopened at a minimum maintenance level. This happened after a Chinese company, General Nice Industries Ltd., had made an offer to buy the naval base (Hannestad, 2016). The official reason that the Greenlandic government and everybody else was given for the limited reopening of the naval base was that Denmark needed it for strategic and logistic reasons (MoD, 2016a, Turnowsky, 2016a).

This sudden Danish need for Grønnedal was a surprise. “The future missions of the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Arctic” (FMMDA) report, which was analysed in the previous chapter, was two years progress and it does not mention Grønnedal with one word (MoD, 2016c). It was thus unexpected
when 5 months later, in December 2016, the Ministry of Defence publishes the “Agreement of strengthening the Danish Defence Ministry’s future task management in the Arctic” (MoD, 2016a).

The new agreement states that it follows the recommendations of the FMMDA report and notes in the very end of the report:

“Finally, in continuation of the analysis [the FMMDA report], the parties have agreed to restore the presence of the armed forces in Grønnedal in the form of a strategic, logistic strongpoint, which can be used partly for storage of fuel, storage of control equipment for the marine environment etc., and partly for training and educational purposes” (MoD, 2016a:2 My translation)\(^1\).

Multiple unnamed sources note according to defencewatch.dk that this last short section of the agreement was added by request of the Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Brøndum, 2016). The paragraph is seen as a reaction to the Chinese bid on the naval base.

According to the anonymous sources Lars Løkke Rasmussen thought that one superpower (United States) with a military base on Greenland was enough (Brøndum, 2016). In order to diplomatically refuse China’s bid without the refusal being seen as a deliberate slight on China, Denmark had to come up with a legitimate reason to withdraw the sale of Grønnedal (see cf. Hannestad, 2016, Krog, 2017, Turnowsky, 2016b). A need for Grønnedal by the Danish Ministry of Defence was seen as a legitimate justification for the government’s decision to take Grønnedal off the market.

Apart from all mentioning of Grønnedal being absent in the FMMDA report, other events also indicate that the restoring of Grønnedal was a hasty decision. One such event is a consultation held on January 28 2016 about the future of Grønnedal, when then Defence Minister, Peter Christensen, said “I must emphasise that the Danish Ministry of Defence has no need or desire to continue

\(^1\) Original quote: "Endelig er partierne, i forlængelse af analysen, enige om at genetablere Forsvarets tilstedeværelse i Grønnedal i form af et strategisk, logistisk støttepunkt, som kan anvendes dels til oplægning af brændstof, opbevaring af havmiljøbekæmpelsesmateriel mv., dels til øvelses- og uddannelses formål."
Grønnedal - neither wholly or partly” (Christensen, 2016b: My translation)\(^{12}\).

There are thus no signs to be found anywhere that Grønnedal would become relevant for Danish defence again.

**The Danish Perspective: Security as Silence**

Political figures in Denmark did not react much to the sudden withdrawal of the Grønnedal sale. The only politician that is quoted in the newsmedia on Grønnedal is Nikolaj Villumsen. Villumsen who is foreign relations spokesperson from the far left Danish socialist party Enhedslisten expressed that the Chinese should not be allowed to buy the naval base. He says

“\(\text{I think that by no means we should sell this base to the Chinese. We have seen that the Chinese behave very aggressively. There is no doubt that we would take a dangerous path regarding security policy, if suddenly we have major Chinese interests in Greenland} \)” (Hannestad, 2016: My translation).\(^{13}\)

Villumsen uses strong value-laden words such as “aggressively”, “dangerous” and calls Chinese interests for “security policy”. What Villumsen does here is a clear example of a speech act as he links the potential sale of the base to security policy.

A speech act is defined as a “discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential threat to security” (Emmers, 2007:112). The quote by Villumsen can be categorized as a speech act as it frames the issue of China’s bid on the naval base as an existential threat to Denmark’s security policy. For this speech act to be classified as a securitization, the audience, here the Danish population, should accept the securitizing issue enough for them to allow extraordinary measures to be imposed. Whether the population accepts the securitizing move depends on the relationship between the actor and the audience, that being between Willumsen and the Danish population in this case. Willumsen belongs

\(^{12}\)Original quote: “Jeg skal understrege, at Forsvarsministeriet ikke har noget behov for eller ønske om at videreføre Grønne- dal – hverken helt eller delvist.”

\(^{13}\)Original quote: “Jeg mener på ingen måde, at man bør sælge den her base til kineserne. Vi ser, at kineserne opfører sig meget aggressivt. Der er ingen tvivl om, at det er en farlig sikkerhedspolitisk vej at gå, hvis vi lige pludselig har store kinesiske interesser på Grønland.”
to a party on the far left on the political scale and may not hold authority to a large part of the Danish population as they do not identify with his views in general\textsuperscript{14}. It is thus likely, that Willumsen in this case does not hold the authority to be a securitizing actor.

When information about Grønnedal was leaked, it did not attract much attention in Denmark. A search on the Danish media archive infomedia.dk shows how five of the Danish countrywide newspapers online posted 17 articles in total containing the term “Grønnedal” after the story broke in December 2016\textsuperscript{15}. It is also noticeable that only Willumsen is quoted on the issue. The other politicians interviewed in the articles have either “no comments” or refer to the official answer by the Defence Minister (see e.g.Hannestad, 2016, Breum, 2016).

The official answer by the Defence Minister, Claus Hjorth Frederiksen, was also given to Aaja Chemnitz Larsen (IA), a Greenlandic member of the Danish Parliament. Larsen asked for an account of how the Greenlandic Government was involved in the decision to withdraw Grønnedal from the market. The Defence Minister’s official answer was that the Greenlandic government was not involved or heard in the decision. He refers to the standard of political agreements being handled among the signatory parties of the Defence Agreement (Forsvarsministeren, 2017).

The question is, why the silence on the issue? As the above media search shows, the case was thus not a big issue to the Danish public. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) argue that in a democracy some security issues are not subject to public debate because the public has accepted that the issue is best taken care of outside the public sphere. When this case of Grønnedal and the Danish government going behind Greenland’s back is not a bigger issue to the Danish public, it could be just this that is the case. The Danish public has accepted that

\textsuperscript{14} Willumsen’s party, Enhedslisten, got 7,8 % of the votes at the last parliamentary election in 2015. (dr.dk, 2015)

\textsuperscript{15} Infomedia.dk monitors Danish media. I accessed it via the library on the University of Southern Denmark, using my student account. The search terms were; Time frame: 12.01.2016-08.05.2018, The Search word: Grønnedal; The web pages of five of the largest news media in Denmark: Information.dk, Jyllands-posten.dk, Berlingske.dk, Kristligt-dagblad.dk and politiken.dk.
the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland is a security issue that is best treated behind closed doors, and the public does thus not demand an explanation from the Government.

As the anonymous Danish governments representatives say the silence stemmed from the concern that an overt securitizing move from the government would bother China which could impact bilateral relations between Denmark and China (see cf. Hannestad, 2016, Krog, 2017, Turnowsky, 2016b). Denmark in particular has a financial reason to keep up good relations with China, as China is among the top 10 export countries for Denmark (seomondo.dk, 2017)

Concern about the security implications of the sale of Grønnedal persisted, however, despite the Danish government’s interest in keeping the subject of the base and China’s bid for it low key. News about the naval base reached the media, because it was leaked to the press by a person/persons close to the inner circle of the government (Brøndum, 2016). The news about the real reason for the re-opening of Grønnedal was leaked to the independent news site defencewatch.dk. Neither defencewatch.dk nor any other media was able to obtain comments from the party leaders behind the defence agreement, the current or the former Defence Ministers (For eksamples see Brøndum, 2016, Hannestad, 2016).

While the politicians are almost conspicuously silent on the issue, Hansen (2002) also stresses that there are times when silence is more revealing. Hansen uses the term “security as silence” to emphasize times in which voicing a security issue is avoided due to the political judgment that it is not beneficial that it becomes articulated in the public. In this case, the silence of the government and the party leaders who were behind the defence agreement is striking. The anonymous sources in e.g. the article on defencewatch.dk refer to the judgment that it is best security wise to not make the real reason for the withdrawal of Grønnedal public (Brøndum, 2016). There is thus a case of “security as silence”.

**The Greenlandic perspective: Greenland should have been informed**

In Greenland, on the other hand, a lot of attention was paid to the aborted sale of Grønnedal, and there was a public demand for an explanation from
Denmark (Turnowsky, 2016a). The reaction from the Greenlandic government is linked to how the Danish government handled the issue.

Continuing with the discourse analysis, a search on infomedia.dk was performed on the websites of the only two countrywide newspapers, “Atuagagdluitit/Grønlandsposten” and “Sermitsiaq”, in Greenland and the Greenlandic official broadcasting cooperation, KNR. The search in Greenlandic media paints a different picture of public perception of Grønnedal than the search in Danish media. There are 60 articles containing the word “Grønnedal” and 24 containing the word “Kangilinnguit”16, which is the Greenlandic name for Grønnedal. Though Greenland’s population is approximately 100 times smaller than the Danish population, the number of online news articles about the naval base is almost five times higher. The articles evolve around two main issues. One issue is that even though the naval base is re-opened, Greenland still demands that Denmark makes an environmental cleanup of the area (see. e.g. Turnowsky, 2016a). The other main issue is that Denmark went behind Greenland’s back (that is even the headline of one of the articles, Turnowski, 2016a) and did not provide sufficient information to the Greenlandic government (see e.g. Turnowsky, 2016b, Sørensen, 2016a)

In Greenland, Suka K. Frederiksen, then Minister for Independence, and Kim Kielsen, Premier of Greenland, both voiced a strong critique of the fact that Denmark did not inform them about the real reason behind the decision to re-open the naval base. Both of them commented on Denmark making decisions about Greenlandic issues behind Greenland's back. Frederiksen says: "It is remarkable if it is a request from a Chinese company that is the real reason for reopening the presence in Greenland - and not the Ministry of Defence's analysis of the future task solution in the Arctic, as stated by the Ministry of Defence. If this is the case, it’s a serious matter" 17 (Sørensen, 2016b: My translation).

16 As I do not understand Greenlandic, there is a chance that some article will appear two times in the search results - if the same article exists in both Danish and Greenlandic. Even if this is the case, the amount of news articles on the naval base are still relatively more voluminous than the amount in the Danish articles.

17 Original quote: "Det er tankevækkende, hvis det er en henvendelse fra et kinesisk selskab, der er den reelle begrundelse for at genåbne tilstedeværelsen i Grønnedal - og ikke
Frederiksen calls it a serious matter, and on the official government website she added: “The Government of Greenland has not been satisfied with the way the Self-Government has been involved and informed in this case.”

(Naalakkersuisut, 2017: My translation). While uttering this harsh critique of the Danish way of handling the case, there is no mentioning of how they would have liked or disliked a Chinese company to overtake the naval base. Frederiksen acknowledges Denmark's legal right not to involve Greenland in a decision regarding defence affairs, but she still thinks that Denmark should have informed Greenland (Naalakkersuisut, 2017).

Iniqi Kielsen who is Vice Chair of the largest Greenlandic party, Siumut, expresses his critique of Denmark more explicitly. In an open letter he writes “The way the Danish Government makes decisions on land in Greenland, without cooperation with the authorities of the country is very worrying” (Turnowsky, 2017: My translation). This lack of cooperation on the Danish part is according to Ulrik Pram Gad, a researcher on the Danish-Greenlandic relationship, a bad case for Denmark. He said to KNR.gl that the lack of cooperation confirms some of the Greenlandic perceptions of a Denmark that works against Greenlandic independence and acts behind Greenland's back on matters regarding foreign and security policy (Sørensen, 2016a).

While Frederiksen's and Kielsen's statements are strong in their critique of Denmark's actions, they do not directly reflect on the fact that it was China who were the potential buyer. By simply not commenting on why Denmark took Grønnedal off the market, they lead the focus away from the securitizing act performed by Denmark and to a different focus; Denmark as an intruder in Greenlandic affairs.

The only direct mentioning of China by a Greenlandic politician is by Aleqa Hammond. She is the former Prime Minister of Greenland, and she said:

Forsvarsmisteriets analyse af den fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis som opleyst af Forsvarsmisteriet. Hvis dette er tilfældet, er det en alvorlig sag.”

18 Original quote: “Naalakkersuisut har ikke været tilfreds med måden, selvstyret har været inddraget og orienteret på i denne sag.”

19 Original quote: ”Den måde den danske regering laver beslutninger om landområder i Grønland, uden samarbejde med myndigheder i landet er meget bekymrende.”
“My view of the Chinese is probably not the same as Denmark’s view of the Chinese. Greenland appeals to cooperation with all nations” (Hannestad, 2016: my translation). The quote from Hammond is published in the Danish newspaper Politiken constitutes a strong move to de-securitize perceptions of China, but it is an attack on Denmark at the same time. Hammond shows how she perceives both Denmark and China as nations who are equally valid to cooperate with for Greenland. She also makes a dig at Denmark for not recognizing China bid for cooperation on equal terms as other nations. In the short quote she equals her view with Greenland’s view of the Chinese. By stating that the Chinese, to her/Greenland is just a nation among other nations she is attempting to de-securitize the situation. In the interview conducted with Hammond for this thesis she also states that up till now, China has not been more difficult to cooperate with than Denmark (Hammond, 2018). As a former premier of Greenland, she also holds some authority in her statements.

Case Conclusion

The case of the naval base and the efforts made by the Danish government to avoid a Chinese company as a potential buyer of property in Greenland paints a picture of Denmark trying to securitize this issue, but doing it gently and not as part of a speech act, thereby avoiding public discussion on the issue. It seems from the notably few number of Danish articles published on the issue, that the public either accepted that this security issue was best taken care of behind closed doors or did not care. From a Greenlandic point of view the picture looks different. There are no signs of Greenlandic politicians trying to securitize the fact that the potential buyer was a Chinese company. There is in fact no public talk about China by politicians in the Greenlandic news media. The actions behind closed doors performed by Denmark are subject to a harsh critique in Greenland. The Greenlandic news media are paying substantial attention to the case, but they do not frame it as a security issue. Rather, the Grønnedal issue is

20 Original quote: “Mit syn på kineserne er nok ikke det samme som Danmarks syn på kineserne. Grønland appellerer til samarbejde med alle nationer.”
treated as a Danish breach of Greenlandic autonomy. Greenlanders demand to be informed about what is going on on their territory.
Mining, Minerals and the Gateway to Independence

This second case study looks into the rich Greenlandic subsoil and the promise of independence that mining seems to make for Greenland. Where the Greenlandic security problems are often framed in economic terms, the solution comes from abroad as shown in the analysis of the official Greenlandic perspective on the Chinese investments. First the case of the Chinese interest in the Greenlandic minerals will be presented and discussed. This will be followed by an analysis of how Denmark and Greenland are in a constant game of securitizing and de-securitizing the minerals. The data applied are mainly stemming from government documents.

The Chinese Interest in the Greenlandic Minerals

The issues dealt with in this case take their point of departure on June 21st 2009. Greenland goes from home-rule to self-rule with the right to claim the authority over almost every policy area. The main exceptions are foreign and security policy. Eventually, they can, if a majority of the Greenlanders wish to, declare independence (Government of Denmark, 2009). The authority over the riches in their subsoil were reclaimed from 1st of January 2010 (Prime Minister's Office, 2018).

In 2012 the Danish newspaper Berlingske scrutinized the 609 page report that underlies the Self Government Act. Berlingske did not find a single paragraph on the security dilemmas that the minerals might present for the Kingdom. On purpose or not – the politicians neglected the issue (Breum, 2013).

On the day that the Self Government Act became effective, Chinese officials were among the official guests in Nuuk. China showed a substantial interest in Greenland’s rare earth elements, and when then Minister for Industry and Labour, Ove Karl Berthelsen, visited China in 2011 he was welcomed by Li Keqiang, who is the second highest ranking person in the hierarchy of China’s government (Jacobsen and Gad, 2018). As shown in the section on Chinese diplomacy in Chapter four, it is a known foreign policy strategy for Beijing to try and establish strong bilateral relationships, and there is no exception with Greenland (Sørensen, 2018b). China operates on a long term basis and their
main interest in the minerals is to ensure their long term supply (see e.g. Sørensen, 2018b, DDIS, 2015).

While China has not been shy in showing its interest in the Greenlandic minerals, they have been subjected to much debate both in Greenland and in Denmark. In Greenland the most heated debate is found in relation to lifting the so-called zero-tolerance policy on uranium mining. Other issues have been in relation to pollution, the environment, and the system’s capacity of integrating a large number of foreign workers (Breum, 2013).

In Denmark scepticism of the dual-use of uranium was voiced and a great disliking of both the possibility of Chinese investors as well as the extraction of uranium itself (Rasmussen and Merkelsen, 2017). China controlled around 96% of the rare earth elements on the world market in 2012, and the Chinese have a history of using its monopoly as an instrument of political pressure, e.g. in a controversy with Japan over fishing rights (Breum, 2013). The Danish Defence Intelligence Service also expresses concerns about the minerals being a potential Chinese tool for political pressure “investments in strategic resources are potentially prone to political interference and pressure” (DDIS, 2015:34).

Greenland’s newly acquired control of the minerals and the potential of uranium mining have therefore created a complex situation where judicial questions intersect with security issues and the prospect of future independence. Below will be analysed how the two governments balance this complex situation.

**The Balancing on a Knife’s Edge of Securitization**

The overall narrative in Greenland is that foreign investment constitutes the key to independence. Where this is particularly clear is in the case of minerals. The higher the revenue that Greenland can get from these minerals, the lesser the chance of survival for the Kingdom (Gad, 2017). In a famous and notorious speech given at the Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavik in 2013, the then premier of Greenland, Aleqa Hammond, said that “Greenland in a not so far future could be a significant uranium exporter – potentially among the world’s
top 10 or maybe even top five exporters of uranium”\textsuperscript{21} (Hammond, 2013: My translation). It was in that same speech that Hammond mentioned that Greenland should work towards gaining independence within her lifetime. Hammond links export of uranium directly to Greenland’s independence.

In terms of securitization theory, the Greenlandic future as an independent nation may be perceived as the referent object. The existential threat comes from Denmark who can refer mineral extraction to foreign and security policy and thus eliminate the Greenlandic possibility for economic sustainability and consequently independence. Denmark did refer it to foreign and security policy. In an answer to the Greenlandic member of the Danish Parliament, Sara Olsvig (IA), the then Danish Minister of Justice, Karen Hækkerup, writes directly “[...] According to the Government, it cannot be ruled out that so-called rare earth minerals may potentially foreign, defence or security policy issues”\textsuperscript{22} (Ministry of Justice, 2014: My translation).

In a report issued by a combined Danish and Greenlandic intra-governmental working group looks into the political consequences of uranium’s dual use. It states again that Greenland has authority over the field of raw materials, but “uranium has foreign, defence and security policy implications”\textsuperscript{23} (Naalakkersuisut and Government of Denmark, 2013:6 My translation). These two above quotes illustrate how Denmark made securitization moves for two of the Greenlandic resources: rare earth minerals and uranium. When the government refers to the resources as having implications for security policy, it is per definition a securitizing move, according to the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998).

While the Government of Denmark does not directly link these security implications that are connected with the dual-use of uranium and rare earth minerals to China in their own reports, the risk assessments issued by the Danish

\textsuperscript{21} Original quote: "At Grønland i en ikke så fjern fremtid ville kunne blive en betydelig uraneeksportør – potentielt blandt verdens top-10 eller muligvis top-5 eksportører af uran."

\textsuperscript{22} Original quote: “[...] det efter regeringens opfattelse ikke kan udelukkes, at såkaldte sjældne jordarter potentielt kan rejse spørgsmål af udenrigs-, forsvars- eller sikkerhedspolitisk karakter.”

\textsuperscript{23} Original quote: ”uran har udenrigs-, forsvars- og sikkerhedsopolitiske implikationer.”
Defence Intelligence Service do. The extensive Chinese interest in the minerals is mentioned in every risk assessment from 2011-2017. In 2012, the minerals are linked to military purposes “China is trying to secure access to critical minerals and rare earths that constitute key components in the development and production of high-tech products – for instance within the defence industry” (DDIS, 2012:12). This linking of the Chinese defence industry to the rare earth minerals in Greenland is a clear securitization move by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service.

History has proven Denmark right in terms of the Chinese interest in the Greenlandic minerals. For example, Greenland Minerals and Energy (GME), an Australian company, has the licence to extract minerals from Kvanefjeld. Kvanefjeld is thought to be one of Greenland’s largest uranium deposits and to hold a large amount of rare earth elements and zinc. In September 2016, GME sold a share of 12,5% equity stake to a Chinese state owned rare earth company named Shenghe Resources Holding Co Ltd (proactiveinvestors.com.au, 2016). Although Shenghe Resources is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, it is controlled by the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources (Martin, 2018).

Though there are multiple efforts from the Danish state to securitize the Chinese interest in the riches of the Greenlandic subsoil, there are also desecuritization moves from the Government of Greenland. By issuing reports like Greenland’s “Oil and Mineral strategy 2014-2018” and “How can growth and welfare in in Greenland be secured?”, that were analysed in chapter five, they praise minerals as bringers of fortune and welfare. The minerals’ possible security implications are not mentioned, but Denmark’s “threat” to securitize is. Greenland’s “Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018” mentions several places where there needs to be created a collaboration between Denmark and Greenland with the purpose of investigating if there are security implications associated with the export of uranium (e.g. Naalakkersuisut, 2014:42). By questioning if security implications exist at all, the Greenlandic government desecuritizes the issue, moving it from the field of the extra-ordinary means to normal politics.
On request from the Greenlandic Self-Government, Professor in International Law, Ole Spiermann, made an advisory opinion on how the competencies with regard to extraction and exportation of uranium are allocated between Denmark and Greenland. In other words, the Greenlandic government asked if Denmark could block their mineral export by referring to foreign and security policy. The assessment from Spiermann is clear: Greenland has the authority over the raw materials. The international treaties that the Kingdom of Denmark has entered into, such as non-proliferation, do not change this. It just means, that it is up to Greenland to assure that the handling of uranium is in accordance with the international obligations (Spiermann, 2014).

Greenland does its best to live up to the international obligations of uranium mining. In May 2017, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, Yukiya Amano, visited Kvanefjeld in Greenland. He was accompanied by the Greenlandic premier, Kim Kielsen. Amano “commended the authorities of Greenland for their robust safety and security preparatory work for a possible rare earth and uranium mine” (IAEA, 2017). A statement like this, coming from the director of IAEA, is strongly de-securitizing. It takes the edge of the implied message from the Danish authorities that Greenland does not possess the institutional capacity to ensure the safe handling of uranium, and that this is the reason why Greenlandic export of uranium is a security issue.

Greenland is eager to live up to these international obligations. If it does so, it proves that Greenland possesses the institutional capacity, that is needed to be its own nation, and that it will be recognized by other states in this matter. By establishing the necessary safeguards and living up to the international treaty obligations of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland demonstrates maturity to the international community (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Søby Kristensen, 2018a). International recognition is important in order to be established as a nation.

Case Conclusion

In the end, the security balance act between Denmark and Greenland was solved in February 2016 with the passing of the lengthy entitled “Agreement between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut regarding the foreign and
security political issues pertaining to extraction and export of uranium and other radioactive materials in Greenland."

The agreement acknowledges Greenland’s full right over its natural resources, including uranium, but also recognizes Denmark’s authority over the practical implementations of international treaties as well as non-proliferation (Government of Denmark and Naalakkersuisut, 2016). As such, it does not restrict or change anything with regard to the Self Government Act. Rather, it specifies exactly who has which responsibilities in the concrete case.

This security controversy thus led to closer cooperation between the two nations along with clearing up who holds which responsibilities in regards to uranium mining. Greenland avoided a full securitization, which in the end is of no interest to either country. It would put the authority over the minerals back under Danish control and Denmark would likely be accused of re-colonization of Greenland.
Chapter Seven - Conclusion

This thesis opened with a quote on the awkwardness that is ever present in Danish-Greenlandic relations. The authors of the quote claim, that the two countries fail to make a number of important decisions, because there is a reluctance to deal with common issues. This thesis investigated one of these common issues; the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. The Chinese interest in investing in Greenland has put the spotlight on the diverging perceptions of security between Denmark and Greenland. While both nations try to conceal the security dispute, it becomes almost impossible when a major power, such as China, shows its interest in Greenland and disrupt the delicate internal dynamics of the Kingdom of Denmark.

The analysis has shown how Denmark perceives the Chinese interest as a security issue and is balancing on a knife’s edge on whether or not to securitize the issue. Greenland do no see any security issues related to Chinese investments. Rather they see a solution to their economic struggle and hence their independence. While the the Danish government is using vague security language related to Chinese interest in Greenland, the Greenlandic government do not use any security language at all on the issue. Both countries have valid reasons for their actions. Denmark feels threatened by the potential of increased political Chinese pressure in Greenland, but can not be to outspoken about it, as saying that directly is it could harm Denmark’s bilateral relations to both China and Greenland. To Greenland a successful securitization would signal to the “world” that Greenland does not possess the competencies and the maturity to stand on its own yet. Greenland is eager to show that it is a safe haven for investors and that it has the political stability that is required to enter into bilateral as well as major investment agreements. Foreign investment agreements, with China in particular, are seen as the gateway to a long sought independence.

A full securitization would also mean that Denmark had to take back the authority given to Greenland in the “Self Government Act” from 2009. This would be perceived as a de facto re-colonization by Greenland and the rest of the world and that is of no interest to Denmark or Greenland.
The central research question of the thesis is;

*How is the Chinese interest in investing in Greenland impacting the relationship between Greenland and Denmark?*

The answer is, that the increased Chinese interest in Greenland impacts the relationship between Denmark and Greenland in a way where they find themselves in a post-colonial struggle. The interest from China means, that the two countries are forced to put the awkwardness behind them and take common action. In the mining case it was illustrated how an agreement between the two governments cleared up the competences between them and how the two governments were forced to cooperate. The Grønnedal case illustrates how Denmark is subject to harsh critique when it does not cooperate with Greenland. The Danish actions revoked reminiscences of colonialism in Greenland and too many cases like this will hurt the Danish international reputation in the long run. The conclusion is thus, that the increased Chinese interest in Greenland impacts the relationship between Greenland and Denmark in a way where they are forced to side step the awkwardness and cooperate more.


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TREATY OF KIEL 1814. Peace of Kiel. The Kingdom of Denmark, The Kingdom of Sweeden.


Appendix One – Written Permissions to Reprint Illustrations

Picture 1

Kære Charlotte Bülow

Der er ingen problemer i at gengive dokumenter der ligger frit tilgængeligt på AO.

Mvh.

Ronja Hougner Vejdegren

Arkivar, event- og skoletjenesteansvarlig

Picture 2

Kære Charlotte,
Du er velkommen til at benytte billedet, hvis du angiver naalakkersuisut.gl som kilde, husk at den ikke må redigeres.

Vi kan kun bekræfte at personerne på billedet er:
Nuærende: Formand for Naalakkersuisoq, Kim Kielsen
De tre andre grønlandske ministre må betegnes som daværende:

Naalakkersuisoq for Råstoffer, Múte B. Egede
Naalakkersuisoq for Erhverv, Arbejdsmarked, Handel og Energi, Hans Enoksen
Naalakkersuisoq for Fiskeri og Fangst, Karl Kristian Kruse.

Vi kan ikke herfra bekræfte de resterende på billedet.

Inussiarnersumik Inuulluaqqusillunga
Med venlig hilsen
Best regards
Nina Jul Larsen
Attaveqaqatigiinnermi tusagassiisartoq
Informationsmedarbejder
Communication Officer